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Essays on Matching With Endogenous Effort
Abstract
This thesis extends the two-sided matching literature by including an endogenous effort choice after the
matching stage. We examine how different matching rules affect incentives to exert effort and the costs paid to
induce various effort levels in three settings: a legal system, an education system, and a labor market.
In an indigent defense program, the government provides counsel for indigent defendants. After the
assignment of an attorney to a defendant, the attorney exerts a costly effort; however, the government only
observes a noisy signal of the effort. We model the problem as a one-to-one matching problem with moral
hazard. We show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to
accommodate defendants' and attorneys' preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching,
defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the part of
counsel.
In in the second case we consider a teacher who chooses a costly effort after observing the distribution of
students assigned to his/her class. We model the problem as a many-to-one matching with a costly non-
contractible effort choice. We show that the effect of policies that affect the student assignment to classes, such
as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs, depends on the curvature of teachers'
marginal utility of effort. We find conditions under which the argmax of a maximization problem is strictly
supermodular or strictly submodular. Subsequently, we characterize conditions under which sorting students
based on their academic performances increases (decreases) the total effort of teachers and the average
performance of students.
In the third setting, we consider a labor market in which each worker chooses an effort after assignment to a
firm. The effort choice, labor in this setting, is observable and contractible. We show that the profit
maximizing labor maximizes the total surplus of the match. Moreover, the unique matching in any equilibrium
maximizes the total surplus; however, this matching may have a lower total output compared with any other
matching. Stated differently, eliminating labor market frictions increases the efficiency; however, it may
increase or decrease the total output.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MATCHING WITH ENDOGENOUS EFFORT
Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
Rakesh Vohra
This thesis extends the two-sided matching literature by including an endogenous eort
choice after the matching stage. We examine how dierent matching rules aect incentives
to exert eort and the costs paid to induce various eort levels in three settings: a legal
system, an education system, and a labor market. In an indigent defense program, the
government provides counsel for indigent defendants. After the assignment of an attorney
to a defendant, the attorney exerts a costly eort; however, the government only observes
a noisy signal of the eort. We model the problem as a one-to-one matching problem with
moral hazard. We show that holding the total expenditure for counsel xed and changing
the matching procedure to accommodate defendants' and attorneys' preferences, i.e., switch
from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse o because a stable
matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the part of counsel. In in the second
case we consider a teacher who chooses a costly eort after observing the distribution of
students assigned to his/her class. We model the problem as a many-to-one matching with
a costly non-contractible eort choice. We show that the eect of policies that aect the
student assignment to classes, such as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher
programs, depends on the curvature of teachers' marginal utility of eort. We nd conditions
under which the argmax of a maximization problem is strictly supermodular or strictly
submodular. Subsequently, we characterize conditions under which sorting students based
on their academic performances increases (decreases) the total eort of teachers and the
average performance of students. In the third setting, we consider a labor market in which
each worker chooses an eort after assignment to a rm. The eort choice, labor in this
setting, is observable and contractible. We show that the prot maximizing labor maximizes
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the total surplus of the match. Moreover, the unique matching in any equilibrium maximizes
the total surplus; however, this matching may have a lower total output compared with
any other matching. Stated dierently, eliminating labor market frictions increases the
eciency; however, it may increase or decrease the total output.
v
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CHAPTER 1 : Overview
This thesis extends the two-sided matching literature by including an endogenous eort
choice after the matching stage. We study the application of matching with an endogenous
eort choice in three settings: a legal system, an education system, and a labor market. In
the rst setting, the matching is one-to-one and there is heterogeneity in both sides of the
market. However, the government pays the cost of each contract and there is no transfer
of utility between the two sides of the market. In this setting, only a noisy signal of eort
is observable and contractible. In the second setting, the matching is many-to-one. We
consider two cases: a case where there is heterogeneity in both sides of the market and a
case where there is heterogeneity only in one side of the market. In this setting, eort is
not contractible. In the third setting, the matching is one-to-one and there is heterogeneity
in both sides of the market. In this setting, utility is transferable between two sides and
eort is observable and contractible. In the rst setting, the uniform random matching is
more desirable than the stable matching. In the second setting, if the marginal utility of a
teacher is supermodular and convex in eort, then the stable matching is the most desirable
matching; however, if the marginal utility of a teacher is submodular and concave in eort,
then the stable matching is the least desirable matching. In the third setting, the stable
matching maximizes the total surplus; however, the total output under the stable matching
can be lower than any other matching.
In the second chapter, we model the problem of assigning counsel to indigent defendants as a
matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component
on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure
for counsel xed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants' and
attorneys' preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants
become worse o because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the
part of counsel. In addition, we show that under suitable conditions random matching is
the ecient way to allocate defendants to counsel.
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In the third chapter, we study the problem of sorting students based on their academic
performances and its eect on teachers' eort choice. The eect of sorting students based
on their academic performances depends not only on direct peer eects but also on in-
direct peer eects through teachers' eorts. We show that standard assumptions in the
literature are insucient to determine the eect of sorting on the performances of students
and so are silent on the eect of policies such as tracking, implementing school choice, and
voucher programs. In order to analyze the eect of sorting on the total performance of
students, we need to understand the eect of sorting on the total eort of teachers, which
depends on supermodularity and submodularity of the argmax of teachers' utility maxi-
mization problem. We nd conditions under which the argmax of a maximization problem
is strictly supermodular or strictly submodular. We show that the eect of policies such as
tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs depends on the curvature of
teachers' marginal utility of eort. We characterize conditions under which sorting increases
(decreases) the total eort of teachers and the average performance of students.
In the fourth chapter, we model a labor market in which workers and rms are heteroge-
neous. A classic question in economics is the welfare consequences of dierent allocations
of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous rms. Welfare is unobservable because the cost
of providing labor to the workers is unobservable. Many researchers use GDP instead of
the total surplus as a proxy for welfare. Within our model, the total output measures the
welfare only if the eective labor supplied by workers does not depend on the rm they are
matched with. The assumption of xed hours of labor supply may seem reasonable in a
market for unskilled labor; however, in a market for skilled labor it seems less plausible. We
show that if there is complementarities between a worker's ability and a rm's technology,
positive assortative matching (PAM) is the only matching in any equilibrium and it's the
unique ecient matching. However, the total output can be lower under PAM compared
with other matchings. We investigate the eect of eliminating all friction, implementing a
centralized clearing house, in a labor market. We characterize two sets of sucient con-
ditions on the production function and cost function under which the total output and
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welfare move in the same direction. Under the rst set of conditions, the increase in total
output overestimates the eciency gain. In contrast, under the second set of conditions,
the increase in the total output underestimates the eciency gain. We identify a third set
of conditions under which the total output and welfare move in opposite directions.
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CHAPTER 2 : Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Indigent
Defendants
2.1. Introduction
Each year, more than a hundred thousand individuals in the U.S. who are too poor to
pay for counsel are subject to criminal prosecution.1 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution guarantees defendants the right to counsel in federal criminal prosecutions but
does not specify how this right is to be exercised. The U.S. Supreme Court expanded these
rights in a series of cases decided in the 1960s and 1970s. The most celebrated of these
being Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), in which the court held that a defendant charged with
a felony, including state crimes, had the right to government-provided counsel.
At present, the government provides counsel for indigent defendants using three dierent
defender systems. The rst is the practice of hiring defense attorneys from public defender
organizations, in which salaried sta attorneys render criminal indigent defense services
through a public or private nonprot organization or as direct government employees (Cohen
(2012)). The second is contract defense programs. In this system, contracts to represent
indigent defendants are awarded through an \auction." The dollar value of the contract
and its duration are specied before the auction. Private attorneys, bar associations, or
law rms indicate their willingness to accept the specied contract. Then the government
awards the contract to a subset of participants based on their quality. The duration of each
contract is one year, and the dollar value is set in terms of a at fee per criminal case or
hourly rate with a cap, which turns into a at fee per case if the attorney's work report
exceeds the cap. The third system is to use assigned counsel programs, in which a judge
assigns an attorney to the case, and the attorney accepts out of professional courtesy.
The common feature of all three systems is that the indigent defendant is not permitted to
choose his/her attorney. Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) summarize this state of aairs as
1Langton and Farole (2010) report, \In 2007, 957 public defender oces across the nation received more
than 5.5 million indigent defense cases."
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follows:
Most citizens would consider it shockingly unethical for an attorney representing
one side in a lawsuit to be selected or paid, even indirectly, by the opposing
party. Yet such principles are violated routinely in this country on a massive
scale. In criminal cases, the great majority of defense attorneys are paid directly
or indirectly by the prosecuting party, the state.
Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) is an extreme example of the denial of choice. Fleeta
Drumgo and ve others were each charged with ve counts of murder, one count of con-
spiracy, and one count of assault while serving a state prison sentence. Four features made
Drumgo's case special: A private attorney had to be appointed because the public defender's
oce was unable to serve. Richard Hodge, the attorney requested by Drumgo was qualied
and willing to represent Drumgo. Drumgo's request for representation by Hodge preceded
the appointment of a dierent private attorney by the trial judge. The trial judge denied
Drumgo's request to be represented by Hodge. Subsequently, the court of appeals ordered
the trial judge to replace Drumgo's court chosen counsel with Hodge. This decision was
overturned by the California Supreme Court on the grounds that the trial judge had the
discretionary power to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant (Tague (1974)).
In this paper, we take up the question of how counsel should be matched to indigent
defendants and analyze the eect of allowing indigent defendants a choice. In our model,
the government moves rst by announcing a contract. This is followed by an entry decision
by attorneys, and then using the announced selection process, the government selects which
attorneys to hire. Then there is a matching stage in which defendants are matched to hired
attorneys. Subsequently, each attorney decides whether to exert eort for his/her assigned
client or shirk the responsibility. Because the government has to provide funding for this
system, the government is responsible for designing the contract using a selection process, a
matching process, and a wage contract. To put it dierently, a contract species a selection
process, a matching process, and a wage contract.
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What distinguishes this problem from other matching problems considered in the literature
is the moral hazard component. The government that is charged with matching defendants
to attorneys must ensure that sucient incentives exist for each attorney to exert eort on
behalf of his/her assigned defendant.
There is much evidence of a moral hazard problem in the representation of indigent defen-
dants, especially under private contractor systems. Furthermore, shirking can be grounds
for appeal (see Strickland v. Washington (1984)). One vivid instance of moral hazard comes
from McDue County, Georgia. In an eort to cut costs on indigent defense, a contract was
awarded to Bill Wheeler, who oered to perform all the county's indigent defense work for
$25; 000, almost $20; 000 lower than the other two bids and $21; 000 lower than the previous
year's cost. As part of his contract, Wheeler continued to maintain a private practice as
well. As Lemos (2000) reports, \most of Wheeler's indigent clients met him for the rst
time in court. After a brief, whispered conversation, Wheeler would recommend a guilty
plea." Between 1993 and 1998, Wheeler led only seven motions and tried only 14 cases in
court, of which only two were jury trials.
The rst part of this paper justies the denial of choice in the indigent defense system. We
compare the indigent defense system under three dierent matching rules. The rst rule
assigns indigent defendants uniformly at random to counsel. We view this as representative
of how defendants are currently matched with counsel (Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) and
Cohen (2012)). We then consider a setting in which defendants are permitted to choose a
counsel from the same group of attorneys as before. Indeed, Tague (1974) and Schulhofer
and Friedman (1993) have all argued for giving defendants a greater say in the choice of
counsel. Schulhofer and Friedman (1993), in particular, suggest the use of vouchers. We
model the outcome of such a voucher system as a stable matching; however, under the
voucher system, the group of attorneys who are assigned to indigent defendants may be
dierent. We show that holding the government's budget xed, changing the matching
from random to stable, i.e., accommodating defendants' and attorneys' preferences, makes
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defendants worse o. Moreover, we show that using a voucher system, i.e., using a stable
matching and changing the set of hired attorneys, makes the indigent defendants worse
o. There are two main reasons why permitting defendants a choice makes them worse o.
First, institutional restrictions require that wage contracts be nondiscriminatory, i.e., the
government cannot give dierent wages to dierent attorneys for dierent cases.2 Under
this restriction, if the government changes the matching rule from uniform random to stable,
then there will be an attorney who knows that he/she will get the worst case after signing
the contract. Hence, this attorney's participation constraint is violated under the previous
wage contract. To satisfy this attorney's participation constraint, the government raises
every attorney's wage contract. As a result, given a xed budget, the government can't hire
enough attorneys and incentivize them to exert eort.
The second reason is risk aversion on the part of the attorneys. The government has
to compensate for the disutility of exerting eort for each attorney by providing a wage
contract. Under the uniform random matching, the government has to compensate all
attorneys for the expected disutility of exerting eort. However, under stable matching, each
attorney is assigned to a specic indigent defendant, and the government has to compensate
attorneys for dierent costs of exerting high eort. Consider a case in which hired attorneys
have the same reservation wage and attorneys are risk averse, i.e., their utility function for
money is concave. The cheapest way for the government to compensate all of them is
to give them a uniform lottery over all indigent defendants and the same wage contract
because their utility function for money is concave. In section 2.5, we formally show that
after relaxing the institutional restriction to only nondiscriminatory wage contracts, if a
condition on reservation wages of a subset of attorneys and a condition on cost function
are satised, the government will optimally choose a nondiscriminatory contract and the
uniform random matching.
The second part of this paper explores an optimal allocation and an optimal contract.
2We discuss reasons for restriction to nondiscriminatory wage contracts in section 2.5.
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We characterize the optimal allocation of attorneys to indigent defendants, in which an
allocation is a lottery over dierent matchings. We show that if the reservation wage of all
hired attorneys is the same, the uniform random matching is optimal. In addition, if the
cost function is separable, then the status quo indigent defense system is using the optimal
contract, even if the government is allowed to use any discriminatory wage contract and any
allocation of attorneys to indigent defendants.
2.2. Model
There is a nite set of indigent defendants J , and jJ j = N . The diculty of each indigent
defendant j 2 J 's case is exogenously given and denoted by dj 2 D.3 Index indigent
defendants according to their case diculty, i.e., dj  dj+18j 2 J . There is a nite set of
available attorneys Ia, and the number of available attorneys exceeds the number of indigent
defendants, i.e., jIaj > jJ j. Each attorney i 2 Ia has an exogenous quality qi 2 Q.4 Index
attorneys in Ia according to their quality, qi  qi+1 8i 2 Ia. Each indigent defendant
is in need of an attorney. By law, the government has to provide each indigent defendant
with one attorney. Furthermore, the government has to ensure that each indigent defendant
receives representation that satises the \eective assistance of counsel" criterion, which we
discuss later.
The game begins with the government announcing a contract. A contract species a selec-
tion rule, an allocation rule, and a wage contract, all of which we dene later. Attorneys
decide to participate given the announced contract. Denote the set of attorneys who par-
ticipate by Ip  Ia.
The government hires a subset of participating attorneys based on the announced selection
rule. The set of hired attorneys is denoted by I  Ip. The government has to hire N
attorneys to ensure that each indigent defendant has an attorney. If jIj < N , then the
3One can interpret the diculty of a case by the type of indigent defendant or the type of case assigned
to the indigent defendant.
4One can determine the quality of an attorney by the amount of experience he/she has and the law school
from which he/she graduated (Iyengar (2007)).
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constitutional right of at least one indigent defendant is violated; hence, we require that
jIj = N for an indigent defense system. Based on the announced allocation rule, attorneys
are assigned to a defendant. Subsequently, each attorney decides to exert high eort or low
eort, denoted by e 2 fel; ehg, on behalf of his/her assigned client.
A wage contract (w1; w2) species payments to hired attorneys based on a noisy signal of
the attorney's eort level. The eort is not observable by the government; therefore, it's
not contactable. Based on the announced wage contract, each attorney is paid a contingent
wage, i.e., w1 if the signal is s1 and w2 if the signal is s2. The signal s 2 fs1; s2g follows
the distribution pl = Pr(s2jel), ph = Pr(s2jeh). s2 is more likely if the attorney exerts a
high eort rather than a low eort, i.e., ph > pl. To put it dierently, s2 is good news
about the attorney's eort being high, and s1 is a bad news about the attorney's eort
being high. The signal can be the number of visits before the trial that the attorney had
with his client, the number of motions that the attorney led, and other indicators of the
attorney's eort. The government cannot rely on an indigent defendant's report about the
attorney's eort, because every convicted indigent defendant will use his/her own report as
grounds for appealing the court's decision.
An attorney with quality qi has an outside option r(qi). If attorney i gets hired, his/her
payo is u(w)   c(e; d), which is determined by wage, eort, and diculty of the assigned
case.
The government wants to minimize the sum of the expected payments to hired attorneys,
i.e.,
P
i2I phw2+(1 ph)w1, subject to providing every indigent defendant with one attorney
who satises the minimum eort condition. Each attorney must choose high eort eh in
compliance with the eective assistance standard specied in the Strickland v. Washington
(1984) ruling. In Strickland v. Washington (1984), the court announced the standard for
evaluating postconviction claims of ineective assistance.
Assumption 1 (i) u(w) is strictly increasing, continuous, and strictly concave in w.
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(ii) High eort costs more than low eort, i.e., c(eh; dj) > c(el; dj) for any dj 2 D.
(iii) r(qi) is nondecreasing in qi.
(iv) c(eh; d) is nondecreasing in d and c(eh; d1) 6= c(eh; dN ).
(v) c(eh; d)  c(el; d) is nondecreasing in d.
Assumptions 1-i and 1-ii on the utility function and the cost function are standard in moral
hazard literature; strict concavity of u(w) follows from risk aversion of attorneys. The main
result of the paper holds for risk-neutral attorneys as well. Assumption 1-iii about the
reservation wage is plausible because the quality of an attorney is a qualitative measure,
which represents demand for an attorney. More demand corresponds to a higher reservation
wage. The rst part of Assumption 1-iv is without loss of generality because we determined
the order of the indigent defendants based on the diculty of their case; however, the
order of these diculties are not specied. To put it dierently, we can dene a new
diculty measure for each case such that c(eh; d) is nondecreasing in d. The second part
of Assumption 1-iv is satised if at least two indigent defendants have cases with dierent
costs of exerting high eort. Assumption 1-v (increasing dierences assumption) states that
if the cost of exerting high eort for case j is higher than that for case j0, then the dierence
between the cost of exerting high eort and low eort for case j should be higher than the
dierence between the cost of exerting high eort and low eort for case j0. We assume
that all attorneys in Ip have a weak incentive to participate, and all other attorneys have
a strict incentive not to participate in the indigent defense system.
The government selects a subset of attorneys to represent indigent defendants from the set
of participating attorneys. A selection rule is a mapping from the power set of Ia into
the power set of Ia, such that  (~I)  ~I 8~I  Ia. To put it dierently, there is a set of
available attorneys Ia, a subset of this set will participate Ip, and then the government uses
the specied selection rule   to hire a subset of this set I =  (Ip).
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Given a set of hired attorneys I, a matching is a one-to-one mapping  : J ! I. Denote
the set of all matchings by M(I). An allocation (I) = ((I))2M(I) is a probability
distribution over the set of all matchings. An allocation determines how to (randomly)
assign a given set of attorneys to a set of indigent defendants. For each matching  2M(I),
0  (I)  1 and
P
2M(I) (I) = 1. Denote the set of all (I) by M(I). Given an
allocation (I), dene (I)(i; j) as the probability that attorney i 2 I matches with
indigent j 2 J . Dene  as N  N matrix, where element (i; j) is (i; j). Note that
 is a doubly stochastic matrix. A random allocation, (I), is an allocation such that
9i 2 I; 9j 2 J : 0 < (i; j) < 1. Under a random allocation, at least one attorney does not
know his assigned case when he/she signs the contract.
The government needs to announce an allocation for each set of hired attorneys. The
government can announce the same rule for all sets of hired attorneys or the government
can use dierent allocations for dierent sets of hired attorneys. In sections 2.3 and 2.4, the
government uses the same allocation no matter which attorneys are defending the indigent
defendants. However, in section 2.5, we specify an optimal allocation for each set of hired
attorneys.
Dene 
(Ia) to be the set of all subsets of Ia of size N , i.e., 
(Ia) = f~Ij~I  Ia; j~Ij = Ng.
An allocation rule  is a mapping from 
(Ia) to M(I),  : 
(Ia) ! M(I), i.e., 
species a probability distribution  over matchings for any subset of size N of Ia.
2.3. Alternative Indigent Defense Systems
We compare the current indigent defense system (status quo) with two alternatives: an
indigent defense system that uses a stable matching (stable matching system) and an indi-
gent defense system that uses vouchers (a voucher system). First, we solve for an optimal
wage contract for a given allocation  and a selection rule  . Using this wage contract, we
analyze the status quo indigent defense system, an indigent defense system under a stable
matching, and an indigent defense system that uses vouchers.
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An indigent defense system under a stable matching gives indigent defendants and attorneys
the right to choose each other. However, the attorneys are selected by the government before
the matching stage. Under a stable matching, an indigent defendant chooses an attorney
from the set of attorneys selected by the government. If the attorney accepts, then he/she
is matched to the defendant.
A voucher indigent defense system allows indigent defendants to select any attorney from the
set of available attorneys. Under a voucher indigent defense system, the government does
not select attorneys before the matching stage. In other words, the set of hired attorneys
under a voucher indigent defense system is dierent from the set of hired attorneys under the
status quo indigent defense system. The outcome of a voucher system is a stable matching.
2.3.1. Optimal wage contract for a given allocation and selection rule
We nd the optimal wage contract from the government's point of view subject to two sets of
constraints. First, the government wants to hire attorneys in the set I = fk0; : : : ; k+N 1g.
Second, the government wants every attorney who is hired to exert high eort no matter
which case the attorney is assigned to. The objective of the government is to minimize the
expected cost of providing counsel to indigent defendants.
Dene u1 = u(w1), u2 = u(w2). Hence a wage contract (w1; w2) in the utility measure is
(u1; u2). Dene h(:) = u
 1(:). Under Assumption 1, h(:) is strictly convex. 5
The following optimization problem identies the optimal wage contract (u1; u2) for a given
5Such notations make the problem of nding the optimal way of implementing an action a convex pro-
gramming problem (see Grossman and Hart (1983)).
12
, such that any attorney i 2 I is willing to participate and exert high eort:
minu1;u2
P
i2I phh(u2) + (1  ph)h(u1)
s:t:
(ph   pl)(u2   u1)  c(eh; d)  c(el; d) 8d 2 D (IC);
u1 + ph(u2   u1)  r(qi) + Ei(c(eh; d)) 8i 2 I (IR);
where:
Ei(c(eh; d)) =
X
j2J
(i; j)c(eh; dj);
is the expected cost of exerting high eort under the allocation  for attorney i. Observe
that because of restriction to nondiscriminatory wage contracts, the objective function can
be simplied to:
X
i2I
phh(u2) + (1  ph)h(u1) = N(phh(u2) + (1  ph)h(u1)):
Note that the only place that allocation enters the government's problem for determining
an optimal wage contract is in the right-hand side of individual rationality (IR) constraints.
Incentive compatibility (IC) constraints hold for 8d 2 D and 8i 2 I because the government
wants all attorneys to exert high eort for every case. Observe that (IC) is the same for
8i 2 I. Therefore, we need to consider (IC) 8d 2 D. (IR) is satised only in expectation
because attorneys are committed to accept any case assigned to them under .
We solve the government's problem for selecting an optimal wage contract, an optimal
allocation rule, and an optimal selection rule in two steps. First, for any given allocation
rule and selection rule, nd the optimal wage contract u1; u2. Then using the optimal
wage contract, in the second step, nd an optimal allocation rule and an optimal selection
rule. Lemma 1 species the optimal wage contract w1; w2 or equivalently u1; u2 for a given
allocation rule and selection rule.
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Lemma 1 Given Assumption 1, for a xed allocation  and a xed set of hired attorneys
I, the optimal wage contract is:
u1 = R   ph
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

; (2.1)
u2 = R + (1  ph)
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

; (2.2)
where R is:
R = maxfr(qi) + Ei(c(eh; d))gi2I :
Proof: See the appendix.
2.3.2. Status quo
The uniform random allocation, u(I), selects each element ofM(I) with equal probability,
i.e., it selects a matching fromM(I) uniformly at random. Observe that under the uniform
random allocation, any element of I has the same uniform probability of matching to any
element of J , i.e., for any i 2 I and any j 2 J , u(i; j) = 1N . The uniform random
allocation rule u, species the uniform random allocation for any set I 2 
(Ia).
The status quo system for assigning counsel to defendants does not rely on the preferences
of defendants and attorneys. The status quo allocation rule that the government uses is
the uniform random allocation rule (Cohen (2012) and Schulhofer and Friedman (1993)).
Furthermore, under the status quo system, the government selects the N highest quality
attorneys from set Ip (Schulhofer and Friedman (1993)). We call this selection rule the
merit-based selection rule.
In our model, under the uniform random allocation, the government is indierent between
selecting which N attorneys from set Ip to hire because xing a nondiscriminatory wage
contract the cost of hiring any attorney from the set of participating attorneys is the same.
Hence, the government is behaving optimally when it uses the merit-based selection rule.
We denote the index of the highest element of this set by k+N 1, i.e., qk+N 1  qi8i 2 Ip
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and k +N   1 2 Ip. Hence the set of hired attorneys under the merit-based selection rule
is fk; k + 1; :::; k +N   1g. To put it dierently, given u and a (w1; w2), the government
is indierent between dierent selection rules   as long as j (Ip)j = N . One such selection
rule is the merit-based selection rule. To model the status quo indigent defense system,
we use the merit-based selection rule that the government currently uses (Schulhofer and
Friedman (1993)). Under the uniform random allocation, R depends on r(qK+N 1) only,
i.e., given the set Ip, which depends on u1; u2, the government's cost does not depend on
other elements of I. Hence, the government hires the highest-quality attorneys from set Ip,
i.e., the government uses the merit-based selection rule. Note that r(qi) is a nondecreasing
function, not a strictly increasing function; therefore, it may be the case that jIpj > N .
In this case, because the cost of a contract with each attorney in Ip is the same for the
government, the government is indierent, so the government selects the highest-quality
attorneys.
The optimal wage contract under uniform random allocation is:
u1 = r(qk+N 1) + Ed(c(eh; d))  ph
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

; (2.3)
u2 = r(qk+N 1) + Ed(c(eh; d)) + (1  ph)
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

; (2.4)
where Ed(c(eh; d)) =
1
N
PN
j=1 c(eh; dj).
The cost of this indigent defense system for the government is:
Cu = N

(1  ph)h

r (qk+N 1) + Ed (c (eh; d))  ph

c (eh; dN )  c (el; dN )
ph   pl

+
phh

r (qk+N 1) + Ed (c (eh; d)) + (1  ph)

c (eh; dN )  c (el; dN )
ph   pl

:
We view the status quo contract as the merit-based selection rule, the uniform random
allocation rule, and the wage contract specied in equations (2.3) and (2.4). We view Cu as
the budget of the status quo indigent defense system.
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The following lemma characterizes the set of attorneys who would participate under the
specied optimal wage contract, the uniform random allocation rule, and the merit selection
rule. Recall that the index of the highest-quality attorney who participates is k + N   1
and any attorney with an index above k +N   1 does not participate.
Although the government is using the merit-based selection rule, hired attorneys are not the
highest-quality attorneys available. The government uses the wage contract to incentivize
attorneys to participate in the indigent defense system. If the wage contract is designed for
the N lowest quality attorneys, then attorneys with reservation wages higher than r(qN )
will not participate. Lemma 2 shows that, even under merit-based selection rule, any hired
attorney has a reservation wage of at most r(qN ). If we consider the reservation wage as
a signal for an attorney's quality, we can conclude that the government is hiring attorneys
with quality close to N lowest-quality attorneys.
Lemma 2 Under the status quo contract the reservation wage of highest-quality attorney
who participates is strictly lower than the reservation wages of attorneys who abstain, i.e.,
r(qk+N 1) < r(qk+N ). Furthermore, if k > 1, then reservation wages r(qi) for all i =
N;N + 1; : : : ; k +N   1 are the same.
Proof: The expected utility of attorney k +N from participating in the indigent defense
system is strictly less than his/her outside option r(qk+N ), otherwise he/she would partici-
pate in the indigent defense system. Moreover, the expected utility of attorney k +N   1
from participating in the indigent defense system is at least r(qk+N 1). Under the uniform
random allocation rule, the expected utility of attorney k + N from participating in the
indigent defense system is equal to the expected utility of attorney k +N   1 from partic-
ipating in the indigent defense system. Hence, their outside options can not be equal, i.e.,
r(qk+N 1) 6= r(qk+N ).
Suppose there exists attorney i0 such that N  i0 < N + k   1 and r(qN+k 1) > r(qi0). By
hiring attorneys i0   N + 1; :::; i0, the government satises all the equilibrium constraints,
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and the expected cost is lower than hiring attorneys k; :::; N + k  1 because Cu is a strictly
increasing function of r(qk+N 1), a contradiction.
2.3.3. An indigent's right to an attorney of his/her choice
In this section, we study two indigent defense systems that permit defendants and attorneys
to choose each other. A stable matching characterizes the outcome of incorporating the
preferences of indigent defendants and attorneys. There are many arguments in favor of
defendants' and attorneys' right to choose.
Tague (1974) and Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) have argued for giving defendants a
greater say in their choice of counsel. There is a natural conict of interest between the
indigent's attorney and the prosecution side, hence giving the power of selecting and funding
of both sides to one oce will result in a conict of interest. Moreover, other government
funded systems, such as health care and the education system, incorporate the preferences of
two sides of the market; one such instance is vouchers in education systems. The outcome of
a system that gives indigent defendants and attorneys a choice is a stable matching. Gale
and Shapley (1962) dene a stable matching: A matching is stable if no matched agent
prefers to be single and no pair of agents prefers each other to their assigned partner in the
matching.
Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) suggest a voucher system for an indigent defense system.
The outcome of a voucher system is a stable matching. However, under a voucher system,
the set of attorneys who get hired is dierent than the set of attorneys who get hired under
the status quo indigent defense system of assigning attorneys to indigent defendants. We
consider a dierent set of hired attorneys under the voucher system when we compare the
outcome of status quo indigent defense system with a voucher system.
17
Stable matching
First, we dene a stable matching and a positive assortative matching. We show that all
stable matchings are positive assortative matchings. Hence, we can restrict our attention
to positive assortative matchings. At the end, we discuss the optimal wage contract under
a stable matching.
To dene a stable matching, we specify preferences for indigent defendants and attorneys.
For a xed wage contract, each indigent defendant j has a preference over attorneys denoted
by j . If two attorneys exert the same amount of eort, all indigent defendants prefer the
attorney with the higher quality to the attorney with the lower quality, i.e., if qi < qi0 then
i j i0;8j 2 J . Moreover, if qi = qi0 , then every indigent defendant is indierent between
attorney i and attorney i0. Given a wage contract, each attorney i 2 Ia has a preference
over cases denoted by i. Each attorney prefers a case that gives him/her a higher utility
to a case that gives him a lower utility under the specied wage contract. Furthermore, if
an attorney is not committed to accepting at least one case and a case that gives him/her a
strictly lower utility than his/her outside option, then he/she prefers his/her outside option.
Under a nondiscriminatory wage contract, all attorneys prefer cases with lower disutility
of high eort, i.e., if c(eh; dj) < c(eh; dj0) then j
0 i j;8i 2 Ia. Moreover, if c(eh; dj) =
c(eh; dj0), then every attorney is indierent between case j and case j
0. Using the preferences
of both sides of this market, we can dene stable matching and a positive assortative
matching for a xed wage contract and nd their relationship.
For a xed wage contract, a matching  is stable if:
1. Every attorney prefers his/her match to his/her outside option, i.e., i i  1(i); 8i 2
I, where i is the attorney's outside option. Note that any indigent defendant prefers
any attorney to his/her outside option.
2. There is no blocking pair. A blocking pair is (i; j) such that (j) 6= i,  1(i) i j and
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(j) j i.
For a xed wage contract, a positive assortative matching is a matching such that:
1. For any i; i0 2 I if qi < qi0 then  1(i) i0  1(i0).
2. For any j; j0 2 J if c(eh; dj) > c(eh; dj0) then (j) j0 (j0).
Lemma 3 species the relationship between stable matching and a positive assortative
matching.
Lemma 3 Under any nondiscriminatory wage contract, if all attorneys have an incentive
to exert high eort, any stable matching is a positive assortative matching.
Proof: Suppose there exists a stable matching  that is not a positive assortative matching,
i.e., there exist i; i0 and j; j0 such that (j) = i, (j0) = i0, qi < qi0 and c(eh; dj) < c(eh; dj0).
Then (i0; j) is a blocking pair, because j0 i0 j and i j i0. Therefore, the matching  is
not stable, a contradiction.
Consider an indigent defense system that uses a positive assortative matching. Each attor-
ney at the ex-ante stage of the game, i.e., deciding to participate in the system or abstain,
knows exactly which case diculty he will face. Under a positive assortative matching, if
there exist an attorney i and case j such that 0 < (i; j) < 1, then c(eh; dj) = c(eh; dj0) for
any other case j0 2 J with 0 < (i; j0) < 1.
The following optimization solves for the optimal wage contract for hiring attorneys from
the set I = fk; :::; k + N   1g, under a positive assortative matching s, when they have
incentive to exert high eort:
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minu1;u2
Pk+N 1
i=k phh(u2) + (1  ph)h(u1)
s:t:
(ph   pl)(u2   u1)  c(eh; d)  c(el; d)8d 2 D;
u1 + ph(u2   u1)  r(qi) + (c(eh; dk+N i))8i 2 I:
We can show that the incentive constraint for the highest d binds.6 The matching is a
positive assortative, so we need to nd q~i such that r(q~i) + (c(eh; dk+N i)) is maximized.
We can relax this problem and only consider the (IR) for qk. Attorney k will get case
N . We can nd a lower bound on an optimal wage contract, denote this by (u1 ; u2 ), by
relaxing the problem and only considering (IR) for the attorney with the lowest quality,
i.e., attorney k:7
u1  r(qk) + c(eh; dN )  ph
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

; (2.5)
u2  r(qk) + c(eh; dN ) + (1  ph)
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

: (2.6)
Voucher system
Critics of the status quo indigent defense system have proposed the use of a voucher indi-
gent defense system because this system gives indigent defendants the right to choose their
attorneys. In a voucher indigent defense system, the government gives each indigent defen-
dant a voucher that species a wage contract for the attorney who accepts the defendant's
case.
Given that every indigent defendant has the same voucher, all indigent defendants will go
6See the proof of Lemma 1.
7Note that this is a lower bound on an optimal wage contract for any indigent defense system that uses
a matching with the following property: Attorney k0, where k0  k, is assigned to case N with probability
1, i.e., 9k0  k such that (k0; N) = 1. Negative assortative matching is one example. All the results in
section 2.4 hold for this type of indigent defense system as well.
20
to their most preferred attorney in the rst round, i.e., they will go to i 2 Ia, where
i j i8i 2 Ia;8j 2 J . Then i will either accept his/her most preferred case, i.e., j where
j i j; 8j 2 J , in this case (i; j) are matched, or i will reject all indigent defendants'
proposals. The same process happens for the remaining indigent defendants and attorneys
until every indigent defendant is matched with one attorney or there are no remaining
attorneys. At the end, if every indigent defendant has an attorney, the allocation is a
positive assortative matching.
2.4. Comparison of Alternative Indigent Defense Systems
In this section, we compare the status quo with two alternative indigent defense systems:
a stable matching system and a voucher system. First, we dene the measure for these
comparisons. Second, we specify the assumption that we need for these comparisons.
If the cost of providing the same N attorneys who exert high eort is lower under the one
contract compared with another contract, then we say that the rst contract is superior
to the second contract. Consider two indigent defense systems with dierent contracts.
Suppose the rst contract is superior to the second contract. Moreover, the budget of the
second indigent defense system is set equal to the budget of the rst system. Then an
indigent defense system that uses the second contract will result in one of the following:
Either eective representation requirement for at least one indigent defendant is violated,
i.e., at least one attorney is choosing el. Or the quality of the lowest-quality attorney under
this contract is strictly lower than the quality of lowest-quality attorney under the superior
contract.
Assumption 2 r(qN )  r(q1) < c(eh; dN )  Ed(c(eh; d)).
Intuitively, the match-specic part of the utility function varies more than the reservation
wage of the N lowest-quality attorneys. Assumption 2 states that the dierence between the
reservation wages of the N lowest-quality attorneys in the set Ia is less than the dierence
between the cost of exerting high eort when matched with the highest cost case and the
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expected cost of exerting high eort when matched uniformly at random. The N lowest-
quality available attorneys have a very similar outside option. Therefore, their reservation
wages are close to each other.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the status quo contract is superior to any contract
that uses a positive assortative matching.
Proof: We show that the cost of the government under a positive assortative matching for
hiring I = fk; :::; k+N 1g is strictly greater than the cost of the government under random
allocation for hiring all attorneys in I. Recall that under the uniform random allocation
rule r(qN ) = r(qk+N 1), so:
r(qk+N 1) + Ed(c(eh; d)) = r(qN ) + Ed(c(eh; d)) < r(q1) + c(eh; dN )  r(qk) + c(eh; dN ),
which implies that:
u1 < u

1 ; u

2 < u

2 :
Because h(:) is a strictly increasing function, we have:
h(u1) < h(u

1 ); h(u

2) < h(u

2 )
)
k+N 1X
i=k
phh(u

2) + (1  ph)h(u1) <
k+N 1X
i=k
phh(u

2 ) + (1  ph)h(u1 ):
Theorem 1 states that under the status quo system budget, using a positive assortative
matching instead of the uniform random allocation, and using the same set of attorneys,
the government cannot induce every attorney to exert high eort. Theorem 1 shows that
permitting indigent defendants and attorneys to choose each other, given the same budget
that the status quo indigent defense system has, will result in a worse indigent defense
system from the indigent defendants' point of view.
Lemma 3 states that any stable matching is a positive assortative matching. Theorem
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1 implies the following statement about the comparison between status quo and a stable
matching system.
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the status quo contract that uses the uniform
random allocation is superior to any contract that uses any stable matching.
There are two reasons that Theorem 1 and corollary 1 hold: restriction of using only
nondiscriminatory wage contracts and the risk aversion of attorneys.
The rst reason is the restriction of using only nondiscriminatory wage contracts. Under
any positive assortative matching, the lowest-quality attorney in set I is matched to the
most dicult case. Consider the participation constraint of this attorney under the status
quo contract and under any contract that uses a positive assortative matching. The reser-
vation wage of this attorney is the same under these two contracts. However, the expected
disutility of eort is strictly larger under a positive assortative matching. Therefore, the
government has to increase the wage contract for this attorney to satisfy his participation
constraint. The wage contract is nondiscriminatory; therefore, increasing a wage contract
for one attorney implies that wage contracts are increased for every hired attorney. The cost
of the government is strictly increasing in u1 and u2; hence, an increase in the wage contract
of every attorney increases the cost of the indigent defense system for the government. Note
that this argument doesn't depend on the risk aversion of attorneys.
The second reason is the risk aversion on the part of attorneys. Consider an example with
two cases and two attorneys with the same reservation wages. In this example, suppose
the government can pay the attorneys dierent wages. The government has to compensate
the attorneys' expected disutility of eort and their forgone reservation wage. Under a
positive assortative matching, the low-quality attorney is matched to the dicult case and
the high-quality attorney is matched to the easy case. Recall that u(w) is strictly concave.
Therefore, it is cheaper for the government to pay equal wages to both attorneys and use the
uniform random allocation, instead of paying a very high wage to the low-quality attorney
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and a low wage to the high-quality attorney. The role of risk aversion is discussed in more
detail in section 2.5.
The following lemma shows that risk aversion is not essential for this result and that without
risk aversion the same conclusion is true.
Lemma 4 If the attorneys are risk neutral, i.e., u(w) = w, Theorem 1 holds, i.e., the
status quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a positive assortative matching.
Proof: Given the set I and , the minimum cost for the government to hire all attorneys
in I and induce every i 2 I to exert high eort is C:
C = minu1;u2
Pk+N 1
i=k phw2 + (1  ph)w1
s:t:
(ph   pl)(w2   w1)  c(eh; d)  c(el; d);
8d 2 D; 8i 2 I;
w1 + ph(w2   w1)  r(qi) + Ei(c(eh; d));
8i 2 I:
Note that the left-hand side of (IR) is equal to 1N of C. In order to nd C, we need to nd
which (IR) binds. Hence, the cost of the government given the set I is:
C = N R:
Under the uniform random allocation, the cost of the government is:
Cu = N  (r(qk+N 1) + Edc(eh; d)):
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Under a positive assortative matching, the cost of the government is:
Cs = N R  N  (r(qk) + c(eh; dN )):
The inequality follows from the denition of R. Hence, under Assumption 2, Cu < Cs, i.e.,
given the same budget that the status quo system has, the outcome of the indigent defense
system under any stable matching is worse than the outcome of the indigent defense system
under the uniform random allocation.
Next, we compare the outcome of the status quo indigent defense system with the outcome
of a voucher system. Under a voucher system, indigent defendants and attorneys have
the right to choose each other; hence, the allocation  is not a choice of the government.
Moreover, the indigent defendants can choose the set of hired attorneys, i.e., selection rule  
is not under the government's control. These two features make a voucher indigent defense
system an interesting alternative system at rst glance. However, the following theorem
shows that the status quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a voucher system.
In order to do this comparison, we nd a lower bound on the cost of the optimal wage
contract from the government's point of view, under a positive assortative matching as the
allocation rule. Recall that the allocation under a voucher system is a positive assortative
matching. Under a voucher system, we consider any set of hired attorneys with size N ,
where attorneys' qualities are at least qk. One possible set of hired attorneys under a
voucher system is fk; :::; k+N  1g. We require the wage optimal contract to give the hired
attorneys incentive to exert high eort under a voucher system.
Theorem 2 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, under the status quo system's budget, switching
from the status quo contract to any contract that uses a voucher system results in one of
the following:
1. At least one indigent defendant doesn't have an attorney.
25
2. At least one hired attorney doesn't have sucient incentive to exert high eort.
3. The quality and the reservation wage of the lowest-quality attorney among hired attor-
neys is strictly lower than the quality and the reservation wage of the lowest-quality
attorney among hired attorneys under the status quo contract.
Proof: From equations 2.5 and 2.6, we know that the cost of the government under any
stable matching, such that the quality of each attorney is at least qk, is at least N(phh(u

2 )+
(1 ph)h(u1 )), because h(:) is strictly increasing in u1 and u2 , N(phh(u2 )+(1 ph)h(u1 ))
is a lower bound on the cost of the government under a positive assortative matching, too.
If we show that the cost of the government under a voucher system for hiring the set I
is greater than the cost of the government under the uniform random allocation rule for
hiring I, then we can conclude that the cost of the government for hiring N attorneys using
a voucher system such that the quality of each attorney is at least qk is greater than the
cost of the government under the uniform random allocation for hiring I. We proved this
in Theorem 1, so no matter which set of attorneys from set Ia are recruited under the
voucher system, as long as their quality is above qk given the same budget, the outcome
of the system under the uniform random allocation is superior to the outcome under the
voucher system. We do not consider the situation in which a voucher system results in some
unmatched indigent defendants, or some indigent defendants are matched with attorneys
with quality lower than qk, because in these situations it is clear that the status quo contract
is superior to the contract that uses a voucher system.
2.5. Optimal Allocation
The status quo allocation rule that the government uses in the indigent defense system is
the uniform random allocation rule, i.e., u = u(I) 8I.
In this section, rst, for any set of hired attorneys I, we characterize the optimal allocation.
Second, for a xed set of hired attorneys I, we specify the conditions on reservation wages
of hired attorneys such that the uniform random allocation is optimal. At the end, we
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specify a set of conditions on reservation wages of attorneys 1; :::; N and the cost function
such that the status quo contract is the optimal contract.
The government wants to minimize the cost, subject to hiring N attorneys and incentivizes
them to exert high eort. The government can choose a selection rule, an allocation rule,
and a wage contract. We showed that the merit-based selection rule is optimal under the
uniform random allocation rule, and we specied the optimal wage contract in Lemma 1.
In this section, we dene and characterize the optimal allocation.
Given a set I, an allocation  is optimal if the cost of the government under the contract
that uses  and the optimal wage contract given , which is specied in Lemma 1, is lower
than the cost of the government under any other contract.
Theorem 3 The following linear program identies an optimal allocation for a given set
I:
(LP*) miny;f(i;j)gi2I;j2J y
s:t:
r(qi) +
P
j2J (i; j)c(eh; dj)  y 8i 2 I;P
j2J (i; j) = 1 8i 2 I;P
i2I (i; j) = 1 8j 2 J;
(i; j)  0 8i 2 I; j 2 J:
Proof: See the appendix.
The solution of linear program (LP*) species a doubly stochastic matrix [(i; j)] and
y, using the Birkho-von Neumann decomposition algorithm, we can nd the optimal
allocation .
If the reservation wages of all hired attorneys are equal, the optimal allocation can be
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characterized easily from the solution of the linear program (LP*). Lemma 5 shows that
the uniform random allocation is optimal under this condition. Therefore, the status quo
allocation that the government uses is indeed optimal if reservation wages of all hired
attorneys are equal. On the other hand, if under the status quo contract reservation wages
of all hired attorneys are not equal, then we can improve the status quo indigent defense
system by using a dierent allocation rule.
Lemma 5 For a xed set of hired attorneys I, the uniform random allocation is the optimal
allocation if and only if r(qi) is the same for all i 2 I.
Proof: See the appendix.
Corollary 2 If the reservation wages of at least two hired attorneys under the status quo
contract are not equal, then there exists a superior contract that hires the same set of hired
attorneys.
Dene a separable cost function as c(e; d) = c(e) g(d). This special cost function represents
the following cost structure: The utility of an attorney is the utility from wage minus
disutility of eort plus nonpecuniary utility that depends on the type of his/her match, i.e.,
u(w) + g(d)  c(e). The separable cost function represents a situation in which there is no
complementarity between case diculty and eort level.
For the rest of the paper, we relax the restriction to the nondiscriminatory wage contracts.
A discriminatory wage contract species a contingent wage for each possible assignment
of attorneys and indigents, i.e., fu1(i; j); u2(i; j)gi2I;j2J . An optimal contract is a con-
tract that minimizes the cost of the government. Note that the government can choose
any selection rule, any allocation rule, and any discriminatory wage contract to minimize
the cost. Recall that the merit-based selection rule is optimal under the uniform random
allocation rule, and based on Lemma 5, the uniform random allocation rule is optimal if
r(qi) = r 8i 2 I. Currently, the government is using nondiscriminatory wage contracts.
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There are several reasons that the government should in fact use nondiscriminatory wage
contracts. First, the government is prosecuting the defendant. At the same time, the
prosecution and attorney are involved in the plea bargaining process. Using discriminatory
contracts signals the government's perception of the likelihood of winning or losing the case.
This signal aects the plea bargaining process. Second, the right to counsel is a constitu-
tional right. Paying dierent wages for dierent cases based on any criteria other than the
case type may seem as discrimination among the indigent defendants. Third, it may be
the case that the government does not have the same information as the counsel about
the diculty of each case. In addition to those reasons, we identify a condition such that
nondiscriminatory wage contracts are optimal even when discriminatory wage contracts are
available. The following theorem identies conditions on reservation wages of a subset of
available attorneys and cost function such that the status quo contract is optimal among a
very broad class of contracts, such as discriminatory wage contracts; stable, deterministic
allocation rules; random allocation rules; and any selection rule that doesn't violate the
constitutional rights of indigent defendants.
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, separable cost function, and r(qi) = r for all
i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng, the status quo contract is the optimal contract.
Proof: See the appendix.
One can use Theorem 4 for comparison and show that Theorem 1 holds because of two
dierent forces; rst, institutional restrictions to nondiscriminatory wage contracts, and
second, the risk aversion of attorneys.
Corollary 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a separable cost function, and r(qi) = r for
all i 2 f1; : : : ; Ng, even if the government can announce discriminatory wage contracts, the
status quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a positive assortative matching and
any contract that uses a stable matching.
Corollary 3 shows that without restriction to nondiscriminatory wage contracts, the status
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quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a stable matching. This result is due
to the fact that attorneys are strictly risk averse. Note that under discriminatory wage
contracts, there may exist a stable matching that is not a positive assortative matching.
2.6. Conclusion
We model the assignment of indigent defendants to attorneys as a matching with a moral
hazard component. Using this model, we show that the matching process is a part of the
contract and that changing the matching process will aect the incentives of attorneys.
Specically, accommodating defendants' and attorneys' preferences encourages some attor-
neys who are hired under status quo to either exit the indigent defense system or to put
in less eort making defendants worse o. Furthermore, using a voucher system makes
defendants worse o.
We characterize an optimal allocation. Using this characterization, we show that the uni-
form random matching is optimal if and only if the reservation wage of all hired attorneys
is the same. Hence, if under the status quo contract at least two hired attorneys have
dierent reservation wages, then there exists a superior contract. The superior contract is
the merit-based selection rule, an optimal allocation, and the optimal wage contract, all
of which we characterize in this article. Under this superior contract, the government can
hire the same set of attorneys and give them sucient incentive to exert high eort with a
strictly lower expenditure. Finally, we show that if the cost function is separable and the
reservation wage of all hired attorneys is the same, then the status quo indigent defense
system is using the optimal contract.
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CHAPTER 3 : Sorting and Peer Eects
3.1. Introduction
We introduce a model to analyze the eect of student sorting on the total eort of teachers
and the average or total performance of students. Our model allows for both direct and
indirect peer eects. First, consider the case of homogeneous teachers who choose eort
after observing their classes' composition. Each teacher chooses an eort based on the
distribution of students' abilities in his/her class, i.e., the teacher's choice may depend
on the whole distribution, not just the mean of students' abilities. The eect of sorting
on the teachers' total eort choice is ambiguous. Because the teachers' total eort may
increase or decrease as a result of student sorting, the eect of sorting on the average
or total performance of students is ambiguous, too. We characterize conditions on the
utility function of teachers under which the total eort of teachers strictly increases or
strictly decreases by sorting. If the teachers' marginal utility of eort is supermodular
(submodular) and convex (concave) in eort, then the total eort of teachers increases
(decreases) as a result of sorting of students. Subsequently, in the absence of direct peer
eects, if performance is convex (concave) in a teacher's eort, the total performance of
an education system increases (decreases) as a result of sorting.1 We show that this result
persists even when we allow for heterogeneous teachers.
Sorting aects students' outcomes because of peer eects. There are two types of peer
eects: direct and indirect. Direct peer eects are the result of student-to-student spillovers
(see Sacerdote (2000), Sacerdote (2011), and Epple and Romano (2011) for a review of the
literature). Indirect peer eects happen through a teacher's eort choice (see Duo et al.
(2011) and Todd and Wolpin (2012)). Duo et al. (2011) report that both direct and
indirect peer eects exist in the data and that the data cannot be explained using only one
kind of peer eects.
1Because most of the results for one set of conditions are parallel in wording to results under the other
set of conditions, instead of stating results under each set of conditions separately, we state both results in
one statement using parentheses.
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Two types of sorting are present in an education system: within-school sorting and between-
school sorting. Within-school sorting, or tracking, is an explicit policy that sorts students
into dierent classes based on their abilities. Sorting between schools happens in dierent
ways, such as: (i) Sorting between public and private schools.2 (ii) Sorting as a result of
voucher programs.3 Chakrabarti (2009) states that \There is strong and robust evidence
in favor of stratication by ability" as a result of Milwaukee Voucher Program. Hsieh and
Urquiola (2006) report that they \nd evidence that the voucher program led to increased
sorting, as the `best' public school students left for the private sector." (iii) Standardized
admissions tests. MacLeod and Urquiola (2012) state that \the introduction of standardized
admissions tests will lead to stratication by ability." (iv) Public information regarding
schools' qualities. Hastings and Weinstein (2007) nd that \providing parents with direct
information on school test scores resulted in signicantly more parents choosing higher-
scoring schools for their children.". (v) Dierent school choice policies.4 Levin (1998)
reports that \evidence is consistent that educational choice leads to greater socioeconomic
(SES) and racial segregation of students." We incorporate both types of sorting in our
model.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on comparative statics. That literature is fo-
cused on the monotonicity of the argmax of a maximization problem;5 however, to analyze
the eect of sorting on the total performance of students, we need to understand the eect
of sorting on the total eort of teachers, which depends on supermodularity and submod-
ularity of the argmax of teachers' utility maximization problem. We nd conditions under
which the argmax of a maximization problem is strictly supermodular or strictly submodu-
lar. More concretely, if the marginal utility of a teacher is supermodular (submodular) and
convex (concave) in eort, then the argmax of the teacher's maximization problem | the
optimal eort of the teacher | is supermodular (submodular); therefore, the total perfor-
2see Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple et al. (2002) for more details.
3See Barrow and Rouse (2008).
4See Avery and Pathak (2015) for the eect of implementing school choice instead of neighborhood
assignment rule on student sorting.
5See Topkis (1998), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), and Edlin and Shannon (1998).
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mance of all teachers increases (decreases) as a result of sorting students. In the absence
of direct peer eects, the only channel through which sorting changes the total/average
performance of students is through indirect peer eects. Hence, if teachers are putting in
more eort altogether and performance is a convex function in the teacher's eort, then the
total/average students' performance increases. On the other hand, if teachers are putting
in less eort altogether and performance is a concave function in the teacher's eort, then
the total/average students' performance decreases. We state the results for an education
system; one can use the same tools to analyze any one-to-many matching with endogenous
eort choice and evaluate the eect of dierent matchings. Moreover, conditions for strict
supermodularity (submodularity) of the argmax are derived for a general maximization
problem; hence, these results can be used in any maximization problem that has the same
structure.
Sorting increases inequality in students' performances; however, if the marginal utility of
teachers is supermodular and convex in eort, sorting increases the total/average perfor-
mance of students. In this situation, sorting is desirable under the Utilitarian welfare
function. On the other hand, if the marginal utility of teachers is submodular and con-
cave in eort, sorting decreases the total/average performance of students and increases
inequality in students' performances. In this situation, sorting reduces both the Utilitar-
ian welfare function and the Rawlsian welfare function. Armative action policies have
the opposite eect of sorting, i.e., these policies reduce sorting; therefore, in this situation,
armative action policies increase both the Utilitarian welfare function and the Rawlsian
welfare function.
The eect of sorting on the total/average performance through the channel of indirect peer
eects is robust, whether direct peer eects exist, even when teachers are heterogeneous
in quality and utility function. Furthermore, if teachers are heterogeneous and classes are
sorted, the standard results regarding the benet of positive assortative matching (PAM)
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versus negative assortative matching (NAM) may not hold.6 We show that even if the
performance function of classes and the utility of teachers are supermodular, the total
performance of students can be higher under negative assortative matching compared with
positive assortative matching. Moreover, inequality is lower under negative assortative
matching compared to positive assortative matching. To put it dierently, the value of
the Utilitarian welfare function and the Rawlsian welfare function are higher under NAM
compared with PAM.
The eectiveness of monetary incentives on teachers' eort choices is debated in the lit-
erature. There is some evidence of a positive eect of monetary incentives in developing
countries (Lavy (2002)). However, in developed countries such as the U.S., the evidence sug-
gests that monetary incentives have an insignicant eect on teachers' eort choices (Fryer
(2013)). We consider the U.S. as the main application, i.e., monetary incentives don't aect
teachers' eort choices. Under a pay-per-performance system in which a teacher's wage
depends on the performance of his/her students, sorting has an impact on the budget of the
education system and results in inequality in teachers' salaries. Sorting increases inequal-
ity in teachers' salaries when teachers are homogeneous and wage increases are based on
students' performances. Sorting increases (decreases) the total payment to teachers if the
total students' performance increases (decreases) and payment to teachers is an increasing
and a convex (concave) function of class performance. Our model can incorporate mone-
tary incentives, too. We consider a general utility function that can incorporate monetary
incentives; hence, we can analyze the eect of sorting under dierent monetary incentive
systems.
In section 3.2, we set up the model and develop the required mathematical tool to handle
the student sorting problem. In section 3.3, we analyze the eect of student sorting on the
total eort of teachers by nding conditions on the utility function of teachers such that
the argmax of their utility maximization problem is supermodular (submodular). Subse-
6See Tincani (2014).
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quently in section 3.4, we show how sorting aects students' outcomes under three settings:
(1) homogeneous teacher with indirect peer eects, (2) homogeneous teacher with direct and
indirect peer eects, and (3) heterogeneous teacher with direct and indirect peer eects.
3.2. Model
Let T be a nite set of homogeneous teachers and I a nite set of students, where jIj = njT j.
A student i 2 I has a type i 2 R+. The type can represent a student's ability, the prior
year's test score, parents' education/income, or any other characteristic that aects the
students' performance. We interpret type as ability.
A matching is an assignment of students to teachers, denoted by  : T ! I, such that
j(t)j = n, where n is the size of the class. Each student is assigned to only one teacher,
i.e.,  1(i) is a function. We denote a class by the prole of types  2 Rn+ assigned to it.
We denote the class assigned to teacher t by t = (i)i2(t).
There is a measure of performance for each student i 2 (t), denoted by p(et; i; t). We
interpret a student's performance as his/her end-of-year test score. There is an aggregate
measure of performance for each class t, denoted by p(et; 
t). We consider the aggregate
measure of performance for each class as the average performances of students in that class.
Teacher t 2 T chooses an eort et 2 [0; 1]. Each teacher gets a payment | wage plus
bonus | based on the aggregate performance of the class, denoted by w(p(et; 
t)).7 Each
teacher t has a utility function f(et; 
t). The utility function is the same for all teachers.8
f(et; 
t) represents the induced utility of a teacher; the utility of a teacher may depend on
the performance of his/her class, his/her wage, and the amount of eort he/she exerts.9 We
assume that the wage structure is xed; hence, if the utility of a teacher depends on the
7Wage can be a constant function.
8We relax this assumption in section 3.4.3.
9For example, the utility function of a teacher can be the non pecuniary utility that he/she gets from
his/her class's performance minus the cost of eort, i.e., f(e; ) = u(p(e; ))   c(e). The cost of eort may
depend on eort and the class composition, i.e., f(e; ) = u(p(e; )) c(e; ). The utility function of a teacher
may include the utility he/she gets from wages or bonuses plus the non pecuniary utility that he/she gets
from his/her class's performance minus the cost of eort, i.e., f(e; ) = u(p(e; )) + v(w(p(e; )))  c(e).
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wage, then f(e; ) is the induced utility function for a xed wage structure. The marginal
utility of eort at e = 1 is strictly negative for any class . The marginal utility of eort at
e = 0 is strictly positive for any class .
We assume that a teacher's utility function and performance of his/her class are symmetric
functions in students' type, i.e., any permutation of a class  generates the same performance
and utility for a teacher: if 0 is a permutation of , then:
f(e; ) = f(e; 0); p(e; i; ) = p(e; i; 0); and p(e; ) = p(e; 0):
We assume a teacher's utility function and the performance of his/her class are three times
continuously dierentiable, i.e., f(e; ); p(e; ) 2 C3.
First, we dene sorting of two classes, and then we show the mathematical relationship
between sorting and the coordinate-wise maximum and minimum of two classes. We order
all the students in the two classes by their types, and then we put the top half of students
in one class and bottom half in the other class. This process is called sorting.10
One-step sorting of two classes is dened as the coordinate-wise maximum and minimum
of two classes:
8; y : 0 =  _ y; 00 =  ^ y;
where for any two vectors  = (1; :::; n); 
y = (y1; :::; 
y
n):
 _ y = (max(1; y1); :::;max(n; yn));  ^ y = (min(1; y1); :::;min(n; yn)):
Lemma 6 There exists a reordering of two classes such that sorting is achieved by one-step
sorting.
10This process is called sorting only if the two new classes have dierent student compositions than they
did before sorting.
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Proof: In the appendix.
For any class , dene ~ as the reordering of the vector  in descending order, i.e., the
permutation of the class in which the rst element is the greatest type in the class, the
second element is the second greatest type in the class, and so on: ~ = (~1; : : : ; ~n) such
that ~i  ~i+1 8i = 1; : : : ; n   1. Given this reordering of the two classes 1; 2, dene a
partial ordering of two classes  as the vector ordering in Rn:
1  2 , ~1i  ~2i 8i = 1; : : : ; n; (3.1)
we call 1 a better class than 2. Note that after sorting of two classes ; y, the sorted
classes 0; 00, have the following property:
  0; y  0; 00  ; 00  y:
We call 0 the lower track and 00 the higher track. Observe that the higher track is a better
class than the lower track.
These two classes can be in one school or in two dierent schools. The former represents
within-school sorting; The latter represents between-school sorting. In between-school sort-
ing, every class in one school is a better class than any class in the other school (based
on the partial order  dened in (3.1)). However, we may be unable to order two classes
in the same school (based on the partial order ) after between-school sorting. All the
following results hold for both between-school sorting and within-school sorting.
A function h : Rn ! R is supermodular if it is pairwise supermodular in any of its two
arguments, i.e., the cross-partial derivatives in any of its two arguments are positive.11
For example, p(e; ) is supermodular if pei(e; )  0; pij (e; )  0 8i; j 2 I; 8e; 8.
If the performance function is supermodular then two types of complementarities exist:
complementarity between eort of the teacher and a student's ability and complementarity
11See Topkis (1998).
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between students' abilities. If cross-partials are strictly positive, then the function is strictly
supermodular. A function is modular if the cross-partial derivatives in any of its two
arguments are zero. For example, p(e; ) is modular if pei(e; ) = 0; pij (e; ) = 0; 8e 2
[0; 1] 8i; j; i 2 R+; j 2 R+. A function is submodular if it is pairwise submodular in
any of its two arguments, i.e., the cross-partial derivatives in any of its two arguments
are negative. For example, p(e; ) is submodular if pei(e; )  0; pij (e; )  0 8i; j 2
I; 8e; 8. If cross-partials are strictly negative, then the function is strictly submodular.
3.3. Characterizing Teachers' Optimal Eorts
In this section, we characterize the conditions under which the argmax of a maximization
problem is strictly supermodular or strictly submodular.12 Furthermore, these conditions
determine the eect of sorting on the total eort of teachers. Each teacher maximizes a
utility function; the argmax of a teacher's maximization problem is his/her optimal ef-
fort, which is unique under the following assumption (Assumption 1). We show that if the
marginal utility of eort is supermodular and convex in eort, then the argmax is super-
modular. Subsequently, we show that sorting increases the total eort of teachers in this
case. Similarly, we show that if the marginal utility of eort is submodular and concave in
eort, then the argmax is submodular. We conclude that sorting decreases the total eort
of teachers in this case.
Assumption 1
i) A teacher's utility function is pairwise supermodular in eort and each student's type,
i.e., fei(e; )  0 8i; e 2 [0; 1];  2 Rn+.
ii) Performance of a class is strictly increasing in the eort of teacher and each student's
type, i.e., pe(e; ) > 0, pi(e; ) > 0. Performance of student i is strictly increasing
in the eort of teacher and increasing in other student's type, i.e., pe(e; i; ) > 0,
pj (e; i; )  0 8j :  1(i) =  1(j).
12We consider only maximization problems that have a unique argmax.
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iii) fee(e; ) < 0, teachers' utility function is strictly concave in eort.
Assumption 1-i captures a complementarity between a teacher's eort and a student's type
in teacher's utility function. To put it dierently, the marginal utility of eort is increasing
in a student's type. Assumption 1-ii states that the performance of a class increases as
the teacher puts in more eort or as the ability of a student increases. Assumption 1-iii
ensures that a teacher's maximization problem has a unique interior solution given by the
rst-order condition, i.e., a teacher chooses an eort such that the marginal utility of eort
is zero.
Given Assumption 1, increasing a student's type | having a better class | results in a
higher eort by the teacher. The following lemma shows this result formally.
Lemma 7 Given Assumption 1, the optimal eort of a teacher (e() = argmaxe2[0;1]f(e; ))
is increasing in any student's type.
Proof: Increasing any student's type in a class results in a better class: i  0i8i)  
0. Using the Topkis theorem, we have   0 ) e()  e(0).
Consider two classes with two teachers. After sorting, the two teachers are assigned to
two new sorted classes, the higher track and the lower track. The teacher assigned to the
higher track puts in more eort after sorting because the higher track is a better class
compared with both initial classes, based on the partial order dened in (3.1). Sorting
increases the eort of the teacher assigned to the higher track and decreases the eort of
the teacher assigned to the lower track. Hence, every student in the higher track has a
higher performance after sorting, and every student in lower track has a lower performance
after sorting. We call this an increase in inequality of students' performances.
Proposition 1 Given Assumption 1, sorting increases inequality in students' performances,
i.e., every student in the higher track has a higher performance after sorting, and every stu-
dent in the lower track has a lower performance after sorting.
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Proof: By Lemma 7, a teacher's eort increases in the higher track. Because performance
is increasing in teacher's eort, every student in the higher track has a higher performance
after sorting. Similarly for students in the lower track, performance decreases after sorting.
Corollary 4 Under the Rawlsian welfare function, i.e., Max-Min of all students' perfor-
mances, sorting decreases welfare.
To understand the eect of sorting on the average/total performance of students, rst we
need to analyze another problem: What is the eect of sorting on the total eort of teachers?
In the following theorem, we show that if the marginal utility of eort is supermodular and
convex in eort, then the argmax of a teacher's utility maximization problem | the optimal
eort of a teacher | is strictly supermodular. Under this condition, sorting increases the
total eort of teachers. Similarly, if the marginal utility of eort is submodular and concave
in eort, then the argmax of the teacher's utility maximization problem | the optimal
eort of a teacher | is strictly submodular.
Condition 1 The marginal utility of eort is supermodular and convex in eort:
feij (e; )  0; feei(e; )  0; feee(e; )  0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j; i 2 R+; j 2 R+;
with at least one strict inequality.
Condition 2 The marginal utility of eort is submodular and concave in eort:
feij (e; )  0; feei(e; )  0; feee(e; )  0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j; i 2 R+; j 2 R+;
with at least one strict inequality.
Theorem 5
1. If Condition 1 is satised, then the optimal eort is strictly supermodular.
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Figure 1: The teacher's marginal utility of eort is convex.
2. If Condition 2 is satised, then the optimal eort is strictly submodular.
Proof: In the appendix.
Theorem 5 holds under weaker conditions, which we characterize in the appendix.
The following thought experiment shows the eect of each inequality in Condition 1 on the
teacher's total eort. Consider a teacher assigned to two identical classes. The teacher
chooses an eort level such that the marginal utility of eort is zero, e in Figure 1, for
both classes. Hence, the total eort is 2e. After sorting, the teacher's marginal utility
changes in both classes. More concretely, the teacher's marginal utility in the higher track
shifts upward and in the lower track shifts downward at e. Suppose these two shifts are
equal, i.e., s1 = s2 in Figure 1. Because the marginal utility of eort is convex, recall that
feee(e; )  0, the increase in the teacher's optimal eort in the higher track is more than
the decrease in the teacher's optimal eort in the lower track, i.e., eh e  e el in Figure
1, with strict inequality if the marginal utility of eort is strictly convex.
On top of that, feij (e; )  0 ensures that the marginal utility of eort is supermodular
in students' type. Therefore, the upward shift in the marginal utility function in the higher
track is greater than or equal to the downward shift in the teacher's marginal utility of
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Figure 2: The teacher's marginal utility of eort is pairwise supermodular in students' type.
eort in the lower track, s1  s2 in Figure 2. This implies that eh   e  e   el in Figure
2, with strict inequality if the marginal utility of eort is strictly supermodular.
feei(e; )  0 ensures that the slope of the marginal utility of eort for the teacher in the
higher track is greater than or equal to the slope of the marginal utility of eort for the
teacher in the lower track. To put it dierently, in Figure 3, the marginal utility of eort
for the higher track is atter than the marginal utility of eort before sorting, which is
atter than the marginal utility of eort for the lower track. Hence, the teacher's optimal
eort in the lower track, el , is to the right of el, and the teacher's optimal eort in the
higher track, eh, is to the right of eh. Therefore, e

h   e  e   el with strict inequality
if feei(e; )  0 holds with strict inequality. To conclude, each of the three inequalities in
Condition 1 ensure that the total eort of the teacher increases after sorting. We state the
result for any initial class composition in the following proposition.
Proposition 2
1. Given Condition 1, sorting strictly increases the total eort of teachers.
2. Given Condition 2, sorting strictly decreases the total eort of teachers.
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Figure 3: The teacher's marginal utility of eort is pairwise supermodular in the teacher's
eort and student's type.
Proof:
1. By Lemma 6, sorting is achieved by one-step sorting. By Theorem 5, the total eort
strictly increases if a class composition changes. Hence, sorting strictly increases the
total eort of teachers.
2. By Lemma 6, sorting is achieved by one-step sorting. By Theorem 5, the total eort
strictly decreases if a class composition changes. Hence, sorting strictly decreases the
total eort of teachers.
The eect of sorting on the total performance of students, under standard assumptions used
in the literature, is ambiguous.
Example 1 (Value-added system) This example is inspired by the value-added measure
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used in Koedel et al. (2015). Suppose p(e; i; ) = ei and
P (e; ) =
1
n
0@X
i2(t)
p(e; i; )  p0(i)
1A ;
where p0(i) is student i's last year's test score. This performance function measures the
average of a teacher's contribution to the increase in the students' scores from their scores
from last year. Consider the following utility function:
f(e; ) = u(P (e; ))  c(e):
Suppose i > 1 and e 2 [; 1] for some 0 <  < 1, u0(:) > 0, u00(:) < 0, c0(:) > 0, c00(:)  0,
and c000(:)  0.
If u000(:)  0, then sorting decreases the total performance of students; however, if u000(:) 
maxf u00(:)  2ne  ; c000(:)g, then sorting increases the total performance of students. (The
proof is in the appendix.)
3.4. Impact of Sorting on Students' Performances
In this section, we characterize the eect of sorting on the average of students' performances
under three dierent settings: (1) only indirect peer eects exist;13 (2) both direct and
indirect peer eects exist; and (3) teachers are heterogeneous in quality and utility function,
and both direct and indirect peer eects exist.
First, we consider a setting with homogeneous teachers and without direct peer eects. The
only impact of sorting on students' performances is through indirect peer eects. Using the
characterization of the total eort of teachers after sorting, we can characterize the eect of
sorting on the average of students' performances. If teachers are putting in more (less) eort
in total and the performance function is convex (concave) in eort, then the total/average
13We assume students benet from high achieving peers in all sections; however, we consider direct peer
eects as the direct peer eects that have dierent eects on students with dierent abilities. Stated
dierently, if the performance is a modular function in students' type, then there is no direct peer eects.
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students' performance increases (decreases). This setting allows us to isolate the eect of
teachers' eort and the role of the curvature of the teachers' marginal utility function in
answering our main question: Does sorting increase or decrease the average performances
of students? Is sorting a desirable outcome based on the utilitarian welfare criterion?
Second, we consider a setting with both direct and indirect peer eects with homogeneous
teachers. Duo et al. (2011) report that both direct and indirect peer eects exist in the
data and that excluding either is inconsistent with their data. Sorting has two eects on
the average of students' performances. If both eects go in the same direction then we
can determine whether sorting increases or decreases the average of students' performances.
However, if these two eects go in opposite directions, then the eect of sorting depends on
the magnitude of each eect; we provide a general method to evaluate the eect of sorting
on average students' performances in this case.
Third, we consider a general environment in which teachers have dierent qualities and
utility functions, and both direct and indirect peer eects exist. We show that | by
extending Assumption 1, Condition 1, and Condition 2 to include teachers' type | the
previous results are robust. Furthermore, if classes are ordered by the partial ordering 
dened in (3.1), we can analyze the welfare implications of positive assortative matching
(PAM) of teachers and classes compared with negative assortative matching (NAM) of
teachers and classes. The curvature of the marginal utility of eort of teachers has an
important impact on this welfare comparison. There are simple examples in which the
usual results about the benets of PAM compared with NAM don't hold. More precisely,
in these examples, switching from PAM to NAM decreases the inequality and increases the
average performances of students, i.e., increases both the utilitarian welfare function and
the Rawlsian welfare function.
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3.4.1. Indirect Peer Eects
Consider an environment in which all teachers have the same quality and utility function.
Suppose there is no direct peer eect.14 What is the eect of sorting on the total students'
performance in this environment? Can we increase the average performance of students
by changing the composition of the classes? In other words, which matching of students
to classes maximizes the total performance of students? In this subsection,we show that
the answers to these questions depend on the curvature of the marginal utility of eort of
teachers. More concretely, if Condition 1 is satised and performance is convex in eort,
sorting increases the total performance of students, i.e., sorting is a desirable outcome based
on the utilitarian criterion. On the other hand, if Condition 2 is satised and performance
is concave in eort, sorting is the least desirable matching of students to classes under both
the utilitarian and the Rawlsian criteria.
Suppose there is no direct peer eect, i.e., pei(e; ) = 0; pij (e; ) = 0 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j; i 2
R+; j 2 R+. Then, the only eect of sorting on students' performances is through indirect
peer eects. The direction of indirect peer eects depends on whether Condition 1 is satised
and performance is convex in eort or Condition 2 is satised and performance is concave
in eort. Under the former, teachers put in more eort in total, and the composition of
classes for a xed level eort doesn't aect the total performance of these classes; therefore,
sorting increases the total performance. Under the latter, teachers put in less eort in total;
hence, sorting decreases total performance.
Theorem 6
1. If Condition 1 holds and performance is modular and convex in eort, sorting strictly
increases the total performance of students.
2. If Condition 2 holds and performance is modular and concave in eort, sorting strictly
decreases the total performance of students.
14See Foster (2006).
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Proof: In the appendix.
The proof species a general method for analyzing other situations as well; for example,
when Condition 1 is satised but performance is concave in eort. Simply put, if equation
(A.10) dened in the appendix is positive (negative), then sorting increases (decreases) the
total performance.
Note that even when there is no direct peer eect and the total eort of teachers increases,
the total performance may increase or decrease by sorting. For example, consider two
teachers who exert the same level of eort for two identical classes; one teacher increases
his/her eort by an amount equal to the amount by which the other teacher decreases his/her
eort. The total performance of these two classes (strictly) increases if the performance
function is (strictly) convex and (strictly) decreases if the performance function is (strictly)
concave.
If Condition 1 holds and performance is modular and convex in eort, the eect of sorting
depends on the welfare function that we use, i.e., based on dierent welfare objectives sorting
maybe desirable or undesirable. If Condition 2 holds and performance is modular and
convex in eort, sorting results in the worst classes' compositions among all other classes'
compositions. Therefore, a policymaker needs to consider the curvature of a teacher's
marginal utility of eort in order to make a decision that increases or decreases the sorting
of students.
Corollary 5
1. If condition 1 holds and performance is modular and convex in eort, sorting improves
the utilitarian welfare function but decreases the Rawlsian welfare function.
2. If condition 2 holds and performance is modular and concave in eort, sorting de-
creases both the utilitarian welfare function and the Rawlsian welfare function.
Because sorting changes the performance of classes, under a pay-per-performance system,
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sorting has an eect on the total payment to teachers | budget of an education system |
and on inequality in payments to teachers. For example, under the value-added system in
the U.S. education system, tracking increases teachers' income inequality; however, it may
increase or decrease the average payment to teachers. The following corollary states these
eects formally.
Corollary 6
1. If Condition 1 holds, performance is modular and convex in eort, and payment
to teachers is an increasing and convex function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases the total payment to teachers.
2. If Condition 2 holds, performance is modular and concave in eort, and payment
to teachers is an increasing and concave function of class performance, then sorting
strictly decreases the total payment to teachers.
3. If payment to teachers is an increasing function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases inequality in teachers' payments.
3.4.2. Direct and Indirect Peer Eects
Suppose both direct and indirect peer eects are present. Direct and indirect peer eects
may aect the total performances of students after sorting in the same direction or in
opposite directions. If both direct and indirect peer eects increases (decrease) the total
performances of students, then the eect of sorting is clear, which we state in the following
theorem. On the other hand, if they have the opposite eect on the total performances of
students, then the eect of sorting on the total performance depends on the magnitude of
direct versus indirect peer eects. We provide a general method to evaluate the eect of
sorting on the total performances of students when the direct and indirect peer eects have
the opposite eect on the total performances of students.
Theorem 7
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1. If Condition 1 holds and performance is increasing, supermodular, and convex in
eort, sorting strictly increases the total performance of students.
2. If Condition 2 holds and performance is increasing, submodular, and concave in eort,
sorting strictly decreases the total performance of students.
Proof: In the appendix.
Note that Proposition 1 and Corollary 4 hold in this subsection. Hence, sorting increases
inequality in students' performance.
Corollary 7
1. If Condition 1 holds and performance is increasing, supermodular, and convex in
eort, sorting improves the utilitarian welfare but decreases the Rawlsian welfare.
2. If Condition 2 holds and performance is increasing, submodular, and concave in eort,
sorting decreases both the utilitarian welfare and the Rawlsian welfare.
Consider a situation in which sorting increases the total performances of students because
of direct peer eects but decreases the total performances of students because of indirect
peer eects. The eect of sorting on the total performance depends on the magnitude of
these two forces. A general method for nding the eect of the tradeo between direct and
indirect peer eects for any performance function p(e; ) and any utility function f(e; ) is:
Step 1: Use equation (A.11) in the appendix to nd the sign of the function 	(e; ), which
is dened in equation (A.11) in the appendix.
Step 2: If 	(e; ) is positive everywhere, then sorting increases the total performance; if
	(e; ) is negative everywhere, then sorting decreases the total performance (proof in the
appendix).
Step 3: If the sign of 	(e; ) is unclear for all eort levels and class compositions, we can
nd the sign of 	(e; ) for a given level of eort and a given class composition. If 	(e; )
is positive, then sorting increases the total performance at the given eort level and class
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composition; if 	(e; ) is negative, then sorting decreases the total performance at the given
eort level and class composition.
In Theorems 6 and 7, we used Assumption 1; specically, we used the assumption that
pi  0 and fei > 0. Note that we can dene the order on i such that pi  0 holds.
To put it dierently, assumption of pi  0 is without loss of generality; however, the
assumption that both pi and fei are strictly positive is not without loss of generality.
One can relax this assumption: suppose teachers prefer low-ability students, i.e., suppose
fei < 0. Then the optimal eort of a teacher is decreasing in a student's type. Moreover,
we can use the general method, i.e., nding the sign of 	(e; ), to determine the eect of
sorting on the total performance of students in this situation.
Using the results from Theorem 7, we can specify the eect of sorting on the teachers'
payment when both direct and indirect peer eects exist.
Corollary 8
1. If Condition 1 holds, performance is increasing and supermodular, and payment to
teachers is an increasing and convex function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases the total payment to teachers.
2. If Condition 2 holds, performance is increasing and submodular, and payment to teach-
ers is an increasing and concave function of class performance, then sorting strictly
decreases the total payment to teachers.
3. If payment to teachers is an increasing function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases inequality in teachers' payments.
3.4.3. Heterogeneous Teachers and Direct and Indirect Peer Eects
Suppose each teacher has a quality | teacher's type | qt 2 R+ that enters the performance
function and teachers' utility function, i.e., teachers' utility function is f(e; q; ) and the
performance of a class is p(e; q; ). We extend Assumption 1 and Conditions 1 and 2 to
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include the teachers' type as well.
Assumption 2 A teacher's utility function is pairwise supermodular in eort and the
teacher's type, i.e., feq(e; q; )  0 8e 2 [0; 1]; q 2 R+;  2 Rn+.
Condition 3 The marginal utility of eort is supermodular and convex in eort, i.e.,
feqi  0; feeq  0; feij  0; feei  0; feee  0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; 8 2 Rn+; 8q 2 R+;
with at least one strict inequality.
Condition 4 The marginal utility of eort is submodular and concave in eort, i.e.,
feqi  0; feeq  0; feij  0; feei  0; feee  0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; 8 2 Rn+; 8q 2 R+;
with at least one strict inequality.
We maintain the assumption of anonymity for students of a class, i.e., teachers' utility
functions and the performance of a class are symmetric functions in students' types. The
one-step sorting is dened as before with the assignment of the higher-quality teacher to
the upper track. Sorting is dened as: Order all the students in the two classes by their
types, then put the top half of the students in one class with the teacher who has the higher
quality and put the bottom half in the other class with the teacher who has the lower
type. If the two new classes have dierent student and teacher compositions as did the two
classes before sorting, then this process is called sorting. After sorting of two classes, we
can order the students of these classes by the binary relation  dened in (3.1). Dene
student sorting with positive assortative matching(PAM) as the sorting of students of two
classes and assigning the higher-quality teacher to the higher-track class and the lower-
type teacher to the lower-track class. Sorting is equivalent to student sorting with PAM.
Similarly, dene student sorting with negative assortative matching(NAM) as the sorting of
students of two classes and assigning the lower-quality teacher to the higher-track class and
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the higher-quality teacher to the lower-track class.
The following theorem states the parallel result of Theorem 6 when teachers are heteroge-
neous. We drive the result parallel to Proposition 2 | the eect of sorting on the total
teachers' eort | in the appendix.
Theorem 8 Given Assumptions 1 and 2:
1. If Condition 3 holds and performance is supermodular and convex, sorting of two
classes increases the total performance.
2. If Condition 4 holds and performance is submodular and concave, sorting of two classes
decreases the total performance.
Proof: In the appendix.
As we stated in Corollary 6, under a pay-per-performance system | such as the value-
added system in the U.S. | sorting changes the inequality in teachers' payment and the
total payment to teachers.
Corollary 9 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satised.
1. If Condition 3 holds, performance is supermodular and convex, and payment to teach-
ers is an increasing and convex function of class performance, then sorting strictly
increases the total payment to teachers.
2. If Condition 4 holds, performance is submodular and concave, and payment to teach-
ers is an increasing and concave function of class performance, then sorting strictly
decreases the total payment to teachers.
3. If payment to teachers is an increasing function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases inequality in teachers' payments.
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Changing the matching from PAM to NAM when students are sorted | or classes are
ordered by the binary relationship  dened in (3.1) | has the opposite eect of sorting.
The following theorem shows one implication of such a change in the matching of classes
and teachers. Note that the standard assumption on supermodularity or submodularity
of the performance function is insucient for analyzing the advantage or disadvantage of
PAM versus NAM.
Theorem 9 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 and Condition 4 are satised and performance
is submodular and concave:
1. The total performance under student sorting with NAM is higher than student sorting
with PAM.
2. Inequality in students' performance under student sorting with NAM is lower than
student sorting with PAM.
Proof: In the appendix.
Corollary 10 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 and Condition 4 are satised and perfor-
mance is submodular and concave:
1. The total payment to teachers under student sorting with NAM is higher than student
sorting with PAM.
2. Inequality in teachers' payment under student sorting with NAM is lower than student
sorting with PAM.
Remark 1 Armative Action:
Let I be a set of students and each student belongs to either the minority group or the
majority group. These students are assigned to two classes 1; 2, such that 1  2.
Suppose the percentage of minority students in class 1 in less than  and the percentage of
minority students in class 2 is more than .
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Armative action policies such as implementing a quota, i.e., assigning at least  percent
of seats to minority students in each class, have the opposite eect of sorting. Denote the
two classes after implementing quotas by 1a,
2
a. The following relation between these classes
hold: 1  1a, 2  1a, 2a  2 , and 2a  1. Armative action policies have
the opposite eect of sorting on the total/average eort of teachers and the total/average
performance of students in Proposition 2 and Theorems 6, 7, and 8.
3.5. Conclusion
We model an education system in which teachers choose their eort level based on the
whole distribution of students, not only the mean of students' abilities. Furthermore, in our
model both direct and indirect peer eects exist. The model incorporates both between-
school sorting and within-school sorting, i.e., tracking.
We show that the standard assumptions in the literature are insucient to understand the
eect of sorting on the total eort of teachers and the total performance of students. We
show that the change in the total performance of students after sorting depends on teachers'
utility function. Even in the absence of direct peer eects, when teachers are homogeneous,
sorting has an eect on the total eort of teachers and the total performance of students
that depends on the curvature of teachers' marginal utility of eort.
We characterize conditions on the utility function of a teacher under which the optimal
eort of a teacher is strictly supermodular. Under these conditions, sorting increases the
total eort of teachers and the total performance of students, even though sorting increases
inequality in students' performances. Therefore, under these conditions, how one evaluates
the eect of sorting on students' performances depends on the welfare criteria chosen, i.e.,
under the Utilitarian criterion, sorting increases welfare; however, under the Rawlsian crite-
rion, sorting decreases welfare. Similarly, we characterize conditions on the utility function
of a teacher under which the optimal eort of a teacher is strictly submodular. Under these
conditions, under both welfare criteria, any assignment of students to teachers is strictly
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preferred to sorting.
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CHAPTER 4 : Total Output as the Measure of Welfare in a Labor Market
4.1. Introduction
A classic question in economics is what are the welfare consequences of dierent allocations
of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous rms. The total surplus of all rms and all work-
ers, welfare, is unobservable because the cost of providing eective labor to the workers is
unobservable. Even though many economists have noted that the total output (GDP) is a
awed measure of economic welfare,1 many researchers in the empirical literature, especially
in the macro search literature, use GDP instead of the total surplus as a proxy for welfare.
Hsieh et al. (2013) use aggregate output per worker to measure the macroeconomic con-
sequences of the convergence in the occupational distribution between white men, women,
and blacks, which captures the change in the allocation of talent to occupations.2 Hagedorn
et al. (2012) use output as the objective of the optimal assignment of workers to rms under
dierent assumptions about the production function of a matched worker-rm pair. Lise
et al. (2015a) develop an empirical search-matching model to estimate the potential gain
from optimal regulation. They dene optimal policy as the policy that maximizes total
output and home production, i.e., GDP.
Within our model, the total output measures the welfare, the total surplus of workers and
rms, only if the eective labor supplied by workers does not depend on the rm they are
matched with. If labor is a complement to or a substitute for a rm's technology, then the
marginal product of labor is dierent when a worker is matched with a more productive rm;
therefore, a worker's labor choice is dierent when he/she matches with a more productive
rm. The assumption of xed hours of labor supply may seem reasonable in a market for
unskilled labor; however, in a market for skilled labor, such as the market for CEOs,3 it
1Jones and Klenow (2010) states \Leisure, inequality, mortality, morbidity, crime, and the natural envi-
ronment are just some of the major factors aecting living standards within a country that are incorporated
imperfectly, if at all, in GDP."
2Firms in our model are the same as occupations.
3See Scheuer and Werning (2015); in their model, a CEO works more at a larger rm because of the
complementarity between the CEO's eective labor and the rm's size.
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seems less plausible.
We show that when one considers the endogenous labor choice of workers, relaxing the
assumption of xed hours of labor supply,4 the total output can be a misleading measure of
welfare: change in the total output may underestimate or overestimate an increase in the
total surplus; moreover, the total output may decrease when the total surplus increases. We
characterize two sets of sucient conditions on the production function and cost function
for which the total output and welfare move in the same direction. Under the rst set of
conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases more than the total
surplus. Stated dierently, the total output overestimates the eciency gains. Under the
second set of conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases but the
increase is less than the increase in the total surplus. In other words, the total output
underestimates the eciency gains. We identify a third set of conditions under which the
total output decreases if the total surplus increases; i.e., if one uses the total output to
measure the welfare eect of a policy, then the conclusion is wrong. To our knowledge,
this is the rst study to model this problem formally, we specify when the total output is a
misleading measure of eciency and in which direction. Put dierently, we specify whether
the bias is upward or downward and when the total output changes in the opposite direction
of welfare.
We develop a model in which rms post personalized wage schedules before matching with
workers, and after the matching stage, workers choose an amount of labor. An equilibrium
outcome in this setting is a collection of wages, the induced matching, and the induced eort
levels which we formally dene in section 4.2.1. Our model is closely related to Bulow and
Levin (2006) and Jungbauer (2016) with an endogenous eort choice after the matching.
There is heterogeneity in both sides of the market. We assume that the marginal product of
labor depends on both the rm's technology and the worker's ability. The worker's ability
and the rm's technology are complements; however, labor can be a complement to or a
4Lise et al. (2015b) report that they \nd mixed evidence in support of the assumption of xed hours of
labor supply."
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substitute for the ability of the worker or technology of the rm. We assume that labor
is observable and contractible. We show that, in both cases, positive assortative matching
(PAM) is the most ecient matching and is the only matching in any contracting equi-
librium. However, PAM may minimize or maximize the total output. Furthermore, PAM,
compared with other matchings, may have higher or lower total labor and total leisure.5 We
conclude that the total output does not always measure the eciency of the labor market
when the amount of labor depends on the matching. More concretely, when eciency in-
creases, the total output may decrease. We characterize a set of sucient conditions on the
production function and cost function under which the total output increases if eciency
increases.
The model is consistent with some empirical nding that may seem in contradiction with
the assumption that there is a complementarity between the worker's ability and the rm's
technology. For example, our results are consistent with better workers working fewer hours
compared with other workers. More concretely, if the production function is submodular
in labor and worker's ability, submodular in labor and rm's technology, and supermodular
in worker's ability and rm's technology, better workers match with better rms and they
work less. In other words, in any equilibrium, the most able worker is matched with the rm
with the highest technology and the most able worker works less than all other workers. In
contrast, the least able worker works more than all other workers. Hagedorn et al. (2012)'s
ndings is another example. They use a large German matched employer-employee data
set to estimate the production function. They solve for the optimal assignment of workers
and rms to maximize output in their data set. Subsequently, they show that this output
is higher than the output under PAM.6 Hence, they state that the production function
is not globally supermodular. We show that, even if the production function is globally
supermodular in workers' type and rms' type, the output maximizing assignment can be
5Labor and leisure move in opposite directions. A policy that increases labor, decreases leisure.
6\Solving the optimal output maximizing assignment problem we nd that optimally assigning individual
workers to individual rms increases output only by 4:47%. In contrast, reassigning workers to the main
diagonal, as would be optimal given the typical assumption of a globally supermodular production function
would imply a 1:43% decline in output."
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dierent from the ecient assignment of workers to rms.
In Section 4.2, we formally describe the model and dene the appropriate notion of equilib-
rium for this model. In Section 4.3, we dene a benchmark contract between a given worker
and a rm in this setting and the induced eort choice under this contract; then, we show
that the social planner chooses this eort level for any matched worker-rm pair. More-
over, the social planner chooses positive assortative matching as the ecient matching. In
Section 4.4, we show that an equilibrium exists, and the equilibrium outcome is unique and
ecient. In Section 4.5, we provide an example in which the production function is strictly
supermodular in rm's technology and worker's ability. However, the total output is the
same under any matching. In this example, the total surplus is strictly higher under PAM
than under any other matching. The main results are presented in Section 4.5, where we
show that the eciency always increases when all frictions in a labor market are eliminated;
however, the increase or decrease in the total output depends on the sign and magnitude
of the third derivative of the production function.
4.2. Model
There is a nite set of workers I and a nite set of rms J , where jIj = jJ j. Worker
i 2 I has an ability, the worker's type; which with a slight abuse of notation, we denote
worker i's ability by i. If i < i0, then worker i has a lower ability than worker i0. Firm
j 2 J has a technology, the rm's type, which we denote by j. If j < j0, then rm j has
a lower level of technology than rm j0. The types of all rms and workers are common
knowledge. A matching is a one-to-one mapping  : I ! J that assigns each worker to a
rm. Worker i chooses an eort e 2 [0; 1] after assignment to a rm. We use the words
eort and labor interchangeably. Eort is observable and contactable. Worker i's utility
from being matched to rm j and exerting eort e is u(i; j; e) = w(i; j; e)   c(e), where
w(i; j; e) is the wage worker i gets if he/she matches with rm j and exerts eort e and
c(e) is the cost of exerting eort e. The reservation wage is zero for all workers. Firm j's
production (output) when matched with worker i who exerts eort e, is v(i; j; e); hence,
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rm j's prot is (i; j; e) = v(i; j; e)  w(i; j; e).
The market unfolds in four stages:
(i) Firms announce personalized wage schedules: fw(i; j; e)ge2[0;1];i2I;j2J .
(ii) Firms and workers match in the matching stage.
(iii) Each worker chooses a utility maximizing eort level given the matching and wage
schedule.
(iv) Each worker receives a wage based on the wage schedule and eort choice.
We model the matching stage as a cooperative game. For any worker-rm pair, given
the wage schedule and the anticipated worker's eort choice, the worker knows the utility
that he/she gets from the match. Moreover, given the wage schedule and the anticipated
worker's eort choice, the rm knows its prot in the match. We assume that, if a worker
is indierent between two rms, he/she will rank rms based on the rm technology; i.e.,
ties are broken in favor of the most ecient match.
We derive our results under a set of standard assumptions, as we want to show that, even
under these assumptions, a change in the total output does not measure the change in the
total surplus.
Assumption 3
1. v(i; j; e) and c(e) are three times continuously dierentiable.
2. c(e) is strictly increasing and convex.
3. v(i; j; e) is strictly increasing, v(i; j; e) is concave in eort, and @
2(v(i;j;e) c(e))
@e2
< 0.
4. 8i; j : v(i; j; 0) = c(0) = 0; 9 > 0 : v(i; j; )  c() > 0, and v(i; j; 1)  c(1) < 0.
5. v(i; j; e) has strictly increasing dierences in worker's type i and rm's type j; i.e.,
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vij(i; j; e) > 0.
The rst four parts are mainly technical assumptions which ensure that the problem of
maximizing the surplus of a worker-rm pair over dierent labor choices has an interior
solution. The last part states that there is a complementarity between a rm's technology
and a worker's ability in the production. All ve parts of Assumption 3 are standard
assumptions.
Assumption 4
1. v(i; j; e) has increasing dierences in worker's type i and eort; i.e., vie(i; j; e)  0.
2. v(i; j; e) has increasing dierences in rm's type j and eort; i.e., vje(i; j; e)  0.
Assumption 5
1. v(i; j; e) has decreasing dierences in worker's type i and eort; i.e., vie(i; j; e)  0.
2. v(i; j; e) has decreasing dierences in rm's type j and eort; i.e., vje(i; j; e)  0.
Under Assumption 4, there is a complementarity between labor and the rm's technology
and between labor and the worker's ability. In contrast, under Assumption 5, labor is a
substitute for the rm's technology and for the worker's ability. Most of our results hold
under either of these assumptions.
4.2.1. Contracting Equilibrium
In this section, we dene a contracting equilibrium and the outcome of an equilibrium. The
denition of equilibrium combines two notions of equilibria, cooperative and noncooperative,
with the requirement that they hold for all histories. This equilibrium denition is not
restricted to a frictionless market.7
Following Cole et al. (2001), we dene a contracting equilibrium as wage schedules for
7One can model a market with frictions as a set of restrictions on the set of feasible worker-rm pairs.
Infeasible pairs cannot be part of an equilibrium or block an equilibrium.
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all rms and workers (on and o the equilibrium path) fw^(i; j; e)ge2[0;1];i2I;j2J , workers'
eort choice fe^(i; j)gi2I;j2J , and the matching of rm and workers such that:
1. Firms maximize their prots given other rms' and workers' strategy.
2. Given the matching and wage schedule, each worker chooses an eort that maximizes
his/her utility on and o the equilibrium path; i.e., e^(i; j) 2 argmaxe2[0;1]u(i; j; w^(i; j; e)).
3. The matching is stable. More concretely, (i) there is no worker, rm, wage schedule
between them, and an eort choice such that both the worker and the rm strictly
prefer it to their current match (no blocking pair). (ii) Each worker gets at least zero
utility, and each rm makes a positive prot (individual rationality).
Note that the no blocking pair condition is an extension of the standard no blocking pair
condition (see Roth and Sotomayor (1992)). This extension of no blocking pair condition
embodies the no regret condition into the standard no blocking pair condition. We assume
that, if a worker is indierent between two or more eort levels, he/she will choose the
highest eort level.
This equilibrium notion combines a noncooperative notion (Nash) and a cooperative notion
(stability), with the requirement that the stability holds after all histories and workers
choose the optimal eort level after all histories. Observe that each rm is best replying
to the other rms' strategy and that the future consequences of any strategy is correctly
foreseen.
The outcome of a contracting equilibrium consists of:
(1) a matching ^,
(2) an eort e^(i) = e^(i; ^(i)) for worker i,
(3) a wage w^(i) = w(i; ^(i); e^(i)) for worker i.
Therefore, given the outcome of a contracting equilibrium, we have:
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(1) a utility u^(i) = w^(i)  c(e^(i)) for worker i,
(2) an output v^(j) = v(^ 1(j); j; e^(^ 1(j))) for rm j,
(3) a prot ^(j) = v^(j)  w^(^ 1(j)) for rm j,
(4) A surplus s^(i; j) = v^(j)  c(e^(i)) = ^(j) + u^(i) for a matched pair (j = ^(i)).
4.3. Eciency
In this section, we characterize the ecient matching and the ecient labor choice for any
matched pair by solving the social planner's problem. We specify a benchmark contract for
a given worker-rm pair; the benchmark contract is the optimal contract from rm's point
of view when the rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to a single worker. Subsequently, we
show that the social planner selects this contract for any given worker-rm pair (Section
4.3.2). In Section 4.3.3, we characterize the ecient matching. Observe that, given the
matching and eort level induced by the wage contract, we can nd the total surplus in the
economy.
4.3.1. Benchmark Contract
We consider a benchmark contract between a pair of worker-rm (i; j) that are matched
together, where the worker has the outside option of r(i; j) from leaving the match. This is
a contract between one rm and one worker without any regard for the labor market. Firm
j's problem is as follows:
max
e;w(i;j;e)
v(i; j; e)  w(i; j; e)
s.t. w(i; j; e)  c(e)  r(i; j);
where r(i; j) is an outside option of the worker that depends only on rm and worker type.
Note that, in this contract, the incentive compatibility constraint is irrelevance, since the
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eort is observable. However, the individual rationality constraint is binding:
w(i; j; e) = c(e) + r(i; j)
Hence, rm j's problem becomes the following:
max
e
(i; j; e) = v(i; j; e)  c(e)  r(i; j) (4.1)
The solution to this problem is the induced eort choice in the benchmark contract. Note
that, under Assumption 3, this eort is unique and maximizes the rm's prot.
4.3.2. Ecient Eort
In this section, we show that the induced eort choice in the benchmark contract is the
social planner's eort choice for any given matched worker-rm pair. The social planner's
problem is:
max
e
s(i; j; e) = v(i; j; e)  c(e) (4.2)
Lemma 8 The social planner's eort choice, for any matched pair, is the eort that the
rm chooses in the benchmark contract.
Proof: Given Assumption 3, the solution to the benchmark contract, rm's prot maxi-
mization problem, is unique. Moreover, the solution to the social planner's surplus maxi-
mization problem is unique, too. The surplus of a match is equal to the prot of the rm
up to a constant in the benchmark contract. Because in the rm j's prot maximization
problem, problem 4.1, we have: s(i; j; e) = (i; j; e) + r(i; j). Hence:
e(i; j) = argmaxes(i; j; e) = argmaxe(i; j; e)8i; j (4.3)
64
The social planner's eort choice is the same as the rm's eort choice in the benchmark
contract.
We call this eort the ecient eort level for (i; j) pair. We denote the surplus at the
ecient eort by s(i; j) = maxe s(i; j; e) = maxe (i; j; e) + r(i; j).
4.3.3. Ecient Matching
Consider the problem of a social planner who wants to maximize the total surplus in the
economy. The social planner can choose the matching and the eort level of each matched
pair. Recall that the social planner selects the ecient eort level for any matched pair.
The following lemma shows that the total surplus at the ecient eort level is strictly
supermodular; therefore, positive assortative matching maximizes the total surplus and the
social planner selects positive assortative matching.
Lemma 9 Under Assumption 3:
1. Given Assumption 4 or 5, the total surplus at the ecient eort level is strictly su-
permodular.
2. Given Assumption 4, the ecient eort e(i; j) is increasing in the worker's type and
the rm's type.
3. Given Assumption 5, the ecient eort e(i; j) is decreasing in the worker's type and
the rm's type.
Proof:
1. By the proof of Lemma 8, the ecient eort level maximizes the surplus of a match.
Therefore, by rst order condition, we have:
se(i; j; e
(i; j)) = 0: (4.4)
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We want to show that, the total surplus at the ecient eort level is supermodular
under either Assumption 4 or 5. By taking cross partial derivative of the surplus, at
the ecient eort level, we have:
sij = sij + siee

j + sjee

i + seee

i e

j + see

ij :
By equation (4.4), se is zero at the ecient level of eort:
sij = sij + siee

j + sjee

i + seee

i e

j
) sij = sij + sie(  sejsee ) + sje(  seisee ) + see(  seisee )(  seisee )
) sij = sij   siesejsee  
seisje
see
+
seisej
see
) sij = sij   siesejsee : (4.5)
Note that sij = vij ; which is strictly positive by Assumption 3. Therefore, if siesej  0,
then the total surplus at the ecient eort level is strictly supermodular. Under As-
sumption 4, we have that siesej  0, because sie  0 and sej  0. Under Assumption
5, we have that siesej  0, because sie  0 and sej  0. Hence, the surplus at the
ecient eort level is strictly supermodular under either Assumption 4 or Assumption
5.
2. Follows from Topkis Theorem (Topkis (1998)).
3. Follows from Topkis Theorem (Topkis (1998)).
The main point in the proof of Lemma 9 is that the super-modularity or sub-modularity
of the ecient eort does not aect the super-modularity and sub-modularity of the total
surplus at the ecient eort level. Therefore, the curvature of the marginal product of
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eort or the marginal cost of eort does not aect the eciency of PAM because the total
surplus is evaluated at the surplus maximizing eort level. In section 4.5.1, we show that
whether PAM has a higher or lower total output compared with other matchings depends
on the curvature of the marginal product of eort and the marginal cost of eort. Similarly,
whether PAM has a higher or lower total labor compared with other matchings depends on
the curvature of the marginal product of eort and the marginal cost of eort.
Note that a worker may work less at a more productive rm. Moreover, a better worker may
work less than a less able worker at a given rm. Nevertheless, the unique ecient matching
is positive assortative matching. Stated dierently, eciency requires the matching of best
worker to the best rm even though the best worker puts in the least amount of work
compared with any other worker at this rm.
4.4. Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness
In this section, we construct a contracting equilibrium. We characterize the set of all
contracting equilibria. We show that the outcome of any contracting equilibrium involves
the ecient eort level for any matched worker-rm pair and the ecient matching.
The following lemma shows that an equilibrium exists.8
Lemma 10 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the ecient eort for each worker-rm pair,
positive assortative matching, and the subsequent wage schedule forms a contracting equi-
librium:
1. w^(1; 1; e(1; 1)) = c(e(1; 1)),
2. w^(j; j; e(j; j)) = bj + c(e(j; j)) for j > 1,9
3. w^(j + 1; j; e(j + 1; j)) = v(j + 1; j; e(j + 1; j)) + bj + c(e(j; j))  v(j; j; e(j; j)) for
j > 1,
8We assume that I = J = f1; 2; 3; : : : ; ng for clarity in this lemma.
9bj is large enough to make worker j indierent between working at rm j   1 and rm j.
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4. w^(i; j; e) = 0 for any other match or eort level.
Proof: In the appendix.
In this equilibrium, rm j oers worker j a rent for working at rm j plus compensation
for the cost of exerting the ecient amount of labor. Moreover, rm j oers worker j + 1
a wage such that the rm's prot when hiring worker j + 1 is equal to its prot when the
rm hires worker j, given that both workers will exert the ecient eort. In other words,
rm j competes with rm j + 1 for worker j + 1. Therefore, the rent that rm j + 1 pays
the worker j + 1 is pinned down by rm j's wage oer to worker j + 1.
The following lemma shows that, in any contracting equilibrium, the eort on the equilib-
rium path for any matched worker-rm pair is unique and ecient.
Lemma 11 Under Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, in any contracting equi-
librium, on the equilibrium path, workers choose the ecient eort level e^(i) = e(i; ^(i)).
Proof: In the appendix.
Given that the eort choice on the equilibrium path is ecient, we show that, in any
contracting equilibrium, the matching is unique and ecient.
Theorem 10 Under Assumptions 3 and 4 or 3 and 5, in any contracting equilibrium, the
matching is positive assortative.
Proof: In the appendix.
This result holds under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5. Recall that, under Assump-
tion 5, the best worker works less than any other worker at the best rm. Moreover, given
the ecient matching, the best worker works less than all other workers. Similarly, the least
able worker has the highest working hours in the economy.
Corollary 11 Under Assumptions 3 and 5, in any contracting equilibrium, the best worker
is matched with the best rm and works less than any other worker. In contrast, the least
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able worker works more than any other worker.
To summarize, a contracting equilibrium exists, and matching and the eort levels on the
equilibrium path are unique, so the total output and the total surplus in any contracting
equilibrium are the same.
4.5. Eliminating all Frictions
In Section 4.5.1, we analyze the eect of eliminating all frictions in a labor market on the
total surplus and total output. If there is no friction in the marker, the unique matching
in any equilibrium is PAM. We consider any departure from PAM as a friction in the labor
market. Stated dierently, if the observed matching in a labor market is not PAM, then
there are some frictions in the labor market. We show that, under Assumption 3 and either
Assumption 4 or Assumption 5, the frictionless market has a higher total surplus than a
labor market with some frictions but it may have lower total output. First, we provide
an example where the production function is strictly supermodular in rm's technology
and worker's ability. At the ecient level of eort, all rms produce the same amount of
output irrespective of their matched workers. Therefore, the total output is the same under
any matching, but the total surplus is strictly higher under PAM than under any other
matching. We characterize three sets of sucient conditions and provide simple examples
for each set of conditions. Under the rst set of conditions, the total output increases when
all frictions are eliminated; however, this increase is an upper bound on the increase in
the total surplus. Under the second set of conditions, the total output increases, but the
increase in the total output is a lower bound for the increase in the total surplus. However,
under the third set of conditions, the total output decreases when all search frictions are
eliminated. In Section 4.5.2, we show that, xing an equilibrium, the total prot of all rms
always increases when all search frictions are eliminated.
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4.5.1. The Total Output
Suppose that the labor market is not ecient because of a friction in labor market. Consider
a policy that decreased the total output. Can we conclude that eciency has decreased as
the result of this policy? In contrast, if a policy increased the total output, can we say that
there was a eciency gain? In this section, we answer these questions.
Given two pairs of matched worker-rm pairs, (i; j); (i0; j0), we dene meet of the two vectors
as the coordinate-wise minimum of the two vectors (i; j) ^ (i0; j0) = (minfi; i0g;minfj; j0g)
and joint of the two vectors as the coordinate-wise maximum of the two vectors (i; j) _
(i0; j0) = (maxfi; i0g;maxfj; j0g).
Lemma 12 Given any matching , there exists a sequence of meet and joint operations
with length n such that the resulting matching is PAM.
Proof: In the appendix.
In the following example, there is a complementarity in the production function between
worker's type and rm's technology. Hence, one may think that, by facilitating the match
between the best worker and the best rm, production will increase (by allowing the matched
pair to choose the ecient eort). However, considering the ecient labor choice, the pro-
duction of a rm is constant. Moreover, the production of all rms is the same independent
of which worker they are matched to. Stated dierently, by changing the matching, the
total surplus changes but the total output is constant. Therefore, if a researcher uses the
output to measure the eciency gain (or loss) from a policy regrading a change in labor
market frictions, the conclusion will be wrong.
Example 2
v(i; j; e) = log(ij + e); c(e) =
e
k
;
where k 2 [1:69; 2] and I; J  [1; 1:3]. Note that sij > 0; sei < 0; sej < 0.
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The ecient eort is e(i; j) = k   ij; hence, the ecient eort is submodular. The total
output at the ecient eort is v(i; j; e(i; j)) = log(k). The total surplus at the ecient
eort is s(i; j; e(i; j)) = log(k)   k + ij. The total output is constant for any matching.
Therefore, PAM maximizes the total surplus and the total leisure. PAM minimizes the total
labor. However, changing the matching does not aect the total output.
It is not always the case that the total output is constant at the ecient eort level. Consider
the following example:
Example 3
v(i; j; e) = ije; c(e) = ke2; s(i; j; e) = ije  ke2;
where k > 0 is large enough to satisfy Assumption 3; i.e., 8i 2 I; j 2 J : k > ij.
The ecient eort is e(i; j) = ij2k ; hence, the ecient eort is supermodular. The total
output at the ecient eort is v(i; j; e(i; j)) = (ij)
2
2k . The total surplus at the ecient eort
is s(i; j; e(i; j)) = (ij)
2
2k   (ij)
2
4k =
(ij)2
4k . Therefore, PAM maximizes the total surplus, the
total labor, and the total output, but it minimizes the total leisure.
We characterize a set of sucient conditions under which positive assortative matching
maximizes the total surplus and total output. Under these conditions, if the total output
increases as a result of a change in labor market, then we know that the total surplus has
increased as well. However, the increase in the total output is an upper bound on the
increase in the total surplus under Assumption 4. We use the result from Kamali-Shahdadi
(2016) to analyze the argmax of the rm's prot maximization problem (the ecient labor
choice). If the marginal prot of labor is supermodular and convex in labor, then the the
ecient labor choice is supermodular,10 and PAM maximizes the total labor, total surplus,
and total output.
10See Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) for formal proof.
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Condition 5 The marginal surplus of eort is supermodular and convex in eort:
seij(e; i; j)  0; seei(e; i; j)  0; seej(e; i; j)  0; seee(e; i; j)  0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j;
with at least one strict inequality.
Theorem 11
Under Condition 5:
1. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, the frictionless labor market,
compared with a labor market with some frictions, has a higher total surplus, higher
total output, and higher total labor.
2. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, eliminating all frictions in the labor market results in
a higher total output and eciency gain; however, the increase in the total output is
greater than the increase in the total surplus.
Proof: In the appendix.
Under the second set of conditions that we characterize, if the total output increases as a
result of a policy change related to labor market frictions, then we can conclude that the
total surplus increased as a result of this policy; moreover, the increase in the total surplus
is at least equal to the increase in the total output. Consider the following example:
Example 4
v(i; j; e) = e(i
1
 + j
1
 ); c(e) =
ek+1
k + 1
;  > 1; k > 1;

k
< 1;
where 8i 2 I; j 2 J : 0 < (i 1 + j 1 ) < 1k+1 .
The ecient eort is e(i; j) = (i
1
 + j
1
 )

k . k < 1; hence, the ecient eort is submodular.
The total output at the ecient eort is v(i; j; e(i; j)) = (i
1
 + j
1
 )
(1+k)
k . The total surplus
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at the ecient eort is s(i; j; e(i; j)) = ( kk+1)(i
1
 + j
1
 )
(1+k)
k . Therefore, PAM maximizes
the total surplus, total leisure, and total output, but it minimizes the total labor.
Condition 6 The marginal surplus of eort is submodular and concave in eort:
seij(e; i; j)  0; seei(e; i; j)  0; seej(e; i; j)  0; seee(e; i; j)  0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j;
with at least one strict inequality. Moreover,
(seisej)(veseee + 2s
2
ee   veesee) + (s2ee)(veseij   sijsee)  (vesee)(seeisej + seejsei)  0:
Theorem 12
Under Condition 6:
1. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, the frictionless market, compared
with a market with some frictions, has a higher total surplus, higher total output, and
lower total labor.
2. Under Assumptions 3 and 5, eliminating frictions in the labor market results in higher
total output and eciency gain; moreover, the increase in the total surplus is greater
than the increase in the total output.
Proof: In the appendix.
It is not always the case that an increase in the total output implies an increase in the total
surplus. Under the third set of conditions that we characterize, if the total output decreases
as a result of policy in the labor market, the total surplus increases as a result of this policy.
Example 5
v(i; j; e) = log(ij + e+ 1)  ((1
3
)(log(ij + 3))); c(e) =
e
k
;
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where k 2 (2:69; 3) and I; J 2 [1; 1:3]. Note that sij = 1+e(ij+e+1)2  1(ij+3)2 > 0; sei < 0; sej < 0.
The ecient eort is e(i; j) = k   ij   1; hence, the ecient eort is submodular. The
total output at the ecient eort is v(i; j; e(i; j)) = log(k)  ((13)(log(ij + 3))); hence, the
total output at the ecient eort is submodular. The total surplus at the ecient eort is
s(i; j; e(i; j)) = log(k)   ((13)(log(ij + 3))) + ijk   1 + 1k . Therefore, PAM maximizes the
total surplus and total leisure. However, PAM minimizes the total output and total labor.
Condition 7 The marginal surplus of eort is submodular, concave in eort, and:
seij(e; i; j) 

see
ve

(sij); seei(e; i; j)  0; seej(e; i; j)  0;
seee(e; i; j) 

see
ve

(cee   see); 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j;
with at least one strict inequality.
Theorem 13
Under Condition 7:
1. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, the frictionless market has the
highest total surplus, lowest total output, and lowest total labor.
2. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, eliminating frictions in the labor
market results in a lower total output and higher total surplus.
Proof: In the appendix.
4.5.2. The Total Prot
In this section, we show that, for a given equilibrium wage schedule, if a policy eliminates
frictions in the labor market, then the total surplus and the total prot move in the same
direction. 11
11However, if rms react to changes in labor market frictions by changing the wage schedule that they
oer to workers, the total prot may decrease while the total surplus increases.
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Theorem 14 Given a contracting equilibrium,
1. if the total surplus is supermodular at the optimum level of eort, then the total prot
of rms is supermodular, and
2. if the total surplus is submodular at the optimum level of eort, then the total prot
of rms is submodular.
Proof: In the appendix.
4.6. Conclusion
If the eective labor supplied by workers does not depend on the rm they are matched
with, then the total output measures the welfare. However, if labor is a complement to or a
substitute for a rm's technology, then a worker's labor choice changes when he/she matches
with a more productive rm. We show that PAM is ecient and incurs in any contracting
equilibrium. However, PAM may minimize or maximize the total output. Therefore, if one
considers the endogenous labor choice of workers, then the total output can be a misleading
measure of welfare: change in the total output may underestimate or overestimate an
increase in the total surplus; moreover, the total output may decrease when the total surplus
increases. We characterize two sets of sucient conditions on the production function and
cost function for which the total output and welfare move in the same direction. Under the
rst set of conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases more than the
total surplus. Stated dierently, the total output overestimates the eciency gains. Under
the second set of conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases but
the increase is less than the increase in the total surplus. In other words, the total output
underestimates the eciency gains. We identify a third set of conditions under which the
total output decreases while the total surplus increases; i.e., the total output misrepresents
the welfare eect of a policy.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. We nd an optimal wage contract by nding binding constraints.
Consider an optimal solution to the minimization problem. The minimization problem is a
standard convex problem. The existence of an optimal solution is guaranteed (see Grossman
and Hart (1983)). Denote the optimal solution by (u1; u2). We characterize the necessary
conditions for (u1; u2) to be an optimal solution by nding which constraint is binding.
Given (u1; u2), nd an attorney i such that:
r(qi) + E
i
(c(e2; dj)) = R:
At least one attorney with this property exists. Denote an attorney with this property by
i.
If the (IR) constraint for i is satised, then all individual rationality constraints are sat-
ised. Because the left-hand side of (IR) is the same for all i 2 I, the right-hand side is
maximized for attorney i.
We claim that (IR) for i binds. Suppose (IR) does not bind for i. Then we can reduce u1
and u2 uniformly to u1  ; u2   such that (IR) is still satised for all i 2 I. Note that this
process does not aect (IC) constraints. Therefore, we can reduce the objective function,
i.e., we can reduce the cost of the government, a contradiction with optimality of (u1; u2).
If (IC) for the highest d is satised, then all incentive constraints are satised. Because
the left-hand side of the (IC) constraint is the same for all d 2 D, the right-hand side is
maximized at dN , the largest element in D.
Finally, we claim that (IC) for the highest d binds. However, suppose (IC) for the highest
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d does not bind. Consider the following relaxed problem:
minu1;u2
P
i2I phh(u2) + (1  ph)h(u1)
s:t:
u1 + ph(u2   u1)  R:
After simplifying the constraint, we get:
minu1;u2
P
i2I phh(u2) + (1  ph)h(u1)
s:t:
(1  ph)u1 + phu2  R:
Suppose ( ~u1; ~u2) is a solution to this relaxed problem, dene u
y
1 = ~u1  1 ph and u
y
2 = ~u2+

ph
.
Because the constraint is satised at ( ~u1; ~u2), it is also satised at (u
y
1; u
y
2). ( ~u1; ~u2) is an
optimal solution to this relaxed problem; therefore, the following problem must be optimized
at  = 0:
min
P
i2I phh( ~u2 +

ph
) + (1  ph)h( ~u1   1 ph )
s:t:
(1  ph) ~u1 + ph ~u2  R:
Taking rst-order condition with respect to  and evaluating it at  = 0, we get:
P
i2I ph(
1
ph
)h0( ~u2)  1 ph1 phh0( ~u1) = 0
) h0( ~u2) = h0( ~u1)
) ~u1 = ~u2:
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Consider the (IC) in the original problem. At ~u1 = ~u2 left-hand side of (IC) is zero. Under
Assumption 1, high eort costs more than low eort; hence, the right-hand side of (IC) is
strictly positive. Thus, at ( ~u1; ~u2), (IC) is violated. Therefore, (IC) constraints bind in the
original problem.
Using this binding constraint, we can nd an optimal wage contract. There is only one
wage contract that satises all these necessary conditions. The optimal wage contract is:
u1 = R   ph
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

;
u2 = R + (1  ph)
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

:
Proof of Theorem 3. Given an allocation  and a set of hired attorneys I, from Lemma
1 the optimal wage contract is:
u1 = R   ph
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

;
u2 = R + (1  ph)
  c(eh;dN ) c(el;dN )
ph pl

:
Hence, the government's problem for nding the optimal allocation is:
min
P
i2I phh(u

2) + (1  ph)h(u1);
or simply:
min phh(u

2) + (1  ph)h(u1):
The objective function depends on  only through R, and it is strictly increasing in R.
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Therefore, the government's problem is:
minR:
Thus, the optimal allocation given the set I solves:
min

24max
8<:r(qi) +X
j2J
(i; j)(c(eh; dj))
9=;
i2I
35 ;
which is equivalent to the linear program (LP*). Given the solution to this program,
f(i; j)gi2I;j2J , we can use the Birkho-von Neumann decomposition algorithm to nd
the optimal allocation .
Proof of Lemma 5. (If direction:) Suppose r(qi) = r for all i 2 I, and the uniform
random allocation is not optimal. Then there exists 0 such that:
max fr + E0(c(eh; d))gi2I < max fr + Eu(c(eh; d))gi2I :
r + Eu(c(eh; d)) is constant for all i 2 I and equal to r +
P
j2J (c(eh;dj)
N . Hence,
max fr + E0(c(eh; d))gi2I < r +
P
j2J (c(eh;dj)
N :
Then under 0 we have:
r +
P
j2J 0(i; j)c(eh; dj) < r +
P
j2J (c(eh;dj)
N 8i 2 I
) Pi2I r +Pj2J 0(i; j)c(eh; dj) <Pi2I r + Pj2J (c(eh;dj)N 
) Pi2IPj2J 0(i; j)c(eh; dj) <Pi2I Pj2J (c(eh;dj)N
) Pj2JPi2I 0(i; j)c(eh; dj) <Pj2J Pi2I (c(eh;dj)N
) Pj2J c(eh; dj) <Pj2J (c(eh; dj));
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a contradiction.
(Only if direction:) If r(qi) is not constant, there exist i
0; i00 2 I such that r(qi0) < r(qi00).
Hence, under the uniform random allocation:
r(qi0) + Eu(c(eh; d)) < Ru ;
and:
r(qi0) + Eu(c(eh; d)) < r(qi00) + Eu(c(eh; d)):
Fix an arbitrary small  > 0 and construct a new allocation  such that:
(i
0; 1) = 1 N ;
(i
0; N) = 1+N ;
(i; 1) =
1
N +

(N 1)N 8i 2 I; i 6= i0;
(i;N) =
1
N   (N 1)N 8i 2 I; i 6= i0;
(i; j) =
1
N 8i 2 I; j 2 J; j 6= 1; N:
Intuitively, the new allocation rule is constructed from the uniform random allocation with
a few changes. i0 gets the easiest case with lower probability under . Everyone else gets the
easiest case with higher probability under . However, i0 gets the hardest case with higher
probability under . Everyone else gets the hardest case with lower probability under .
Note that  is indeed an allocation because each row and column of  adds up to 1. For
an arbitrary small  > 0 we have:
r(qi0) + E(c(eh; d)) < r(qi00) + E(c(eh; d)):
For any i 6= i0:
r(qi) + E(c(eh; d)) < r(qi) + Eu(c(eh; d));
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one such i is i = i00:
r(q00i ) + E(c(eh; d)) < r(q
00
i ) + Eu(c(eh; d))  Ru :
However, for i0:
r(qi0) + E(c(eh; d)) > r(qi0) + Eu(c(eh; d)):
Therefore:
r(qi0) + Eu(c(eh; d)) < r(qi00) + E(c(eh; d))  Ru :
We can conclude that
R < Ru :
This is a contradiction with optimality of the uniform random allocation.
Proof of Theorem 4. From Lemma 5 we know that the uniform random allocation is
the optimal allocation. We need to show that a nondiscriminatory wage contract is optimal
even if the government can use discriminatory wage contracts.
Consider a selection rule, an allocation rule , and an optimal discriminatory wage contract
fuy1(i; j); uy2(i; j)gi2Ia;j2J . We need to show that the cost of government under this contract
is higher than the cost of the government under the status quo contract. We restrict our
attention to optimal discriminatory wage contracts only because if this claim is true for any
contract that uses an optimal discriminatory wage contract then it is true for any other
contract, too.
Denote the set of hired attorneys under this contract by I, the allocation by , and the
optimal discriminatory wage contract by fuy1(i; j); uy2(i; j)gi2I;j2J . After the contract is
signed, attorneys and indigent defendants are matched based on . Note that each attorney
is assigned to one indigent defendant, and denote this realized matching by . The cost of
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government if  is realized is:
C =
X
i2I
(p2h(u

2(i; 
 1(i))) + (1  p2)h(u1(i;  1(i)));
where:
uy1(i; 
 1(i)) = r(qi) + c(eh; d 1(i))  ph
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

;
uy2(i; 
 1(i)) = r(qi) + c(eh; d 1(i)) + (1  ph)
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

:
Finding an optimal discriminatory wage contract is simple. For each possible match (~j) =
~i, there are two binding constraints, an incentive compatibility constraint for ~i when he/she
is matched to indigent defendant ~j, and an individual rationality constraint for ~i when
he/she is matched to indigent defendant ~j. One can show these constraints bind at opti-
mality. Hence, the optimal wage contract uy1(i; j); u
y
2(i; j) is derived by solving each possible
match under the allocation . Note that c(e; dj) = c(e) g(dj) implies c(eh; dj) c(el; dj) =
c(eh)  c(el).
For any set of hired attorneys I, we know that r(qi) > r(q1) = r8i 2 I. Therefore:
u1(i;  1(i))  r + c(eh; d 1(i))  ph
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

;
u2(i;  1(i))  r + c(eh; d 1(i)) + (1  ph)
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

:
Dene
 = r   ph
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

;
 = r + (1  ph)
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

:
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Hence,
u1(i;  1(i))  c(eh; d 1(i)) + ; (A.1)
u2(i;  1(i))  c(eh; d 1(i)) + : (A.2)
The cost of the government under the uniform random allocation with nondiscriminatory
wage contract is
Cu =
X
i2I
(p2h(u
y
2) + (1  p2)h(uy1));
where:
uy1 = r + Ed(c(eh; d))  ph
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

= Ed(c(eh; d)) + ;
uy2 = r + Ed(c(eh; d)) + (1  ph)
  c(eh) c(el)
ph pl

= Ed(c(eh; d)) + :
Suppose there exists i0 2 I such that u2(i0;  1(i0)) 6=
P
i2I u

2(i;
 1(i))
N , i.e., at least two
attorneys are getting dierent wages under the high signal. Under Assumption 1, h(:) is a
strictly convex function. By Jensen's inequality, we have:
h(
P
i2I u

2(i;
 1(i))
N ) <
P
i2I h(u

2(i;
 1(i))
N : (A.3)
From equation (A.2) we have:
P
i2I u

2(i;
 1(i))
N 
P
i2I (c(eh;d 1(i))+)
N (A.4)
=  +
P
i2I c(eh;d 1(i))
N =  +
P
j2J c(eh;dj)
N =  + Ed(c(eh; d)) = u
y
2: (A.5)
Under Assumption 1, h(:) is a strictly increasing function; therefore:
h(uy2)  h(
P
i2I u

2(i;
 1(i))
N ): (A.6)
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Observe that that if there does not exist i0 2 I such that u2(i0;  1(i0)) 6=
P
i2I u

2(i;
 1(i))
N ,
then for at least one attorney i 2 I we must have that r(qi) > r. In this case, the Jensen's
inequality is a weak inequality; however, inequity (A.5) is a strict inequality. Therefore,
inequality (A.6) holds with strict inequality.
By comparing inequality (A.3) and inequality (A.6), we get:
X
i2I
h(uy2) <
X
i2I
h(u2(i; 
 1(i)):
Similarly: X
i2I
h(uy1) <
X
i2I
h(u1(i; 
 1(i)):
Therefore:
Cu < C:
We can conclude that the status quo system, i.e., the merit-based selection rule, the uniform
random allocation rule, and nondiscriminatory wage contracts, is the optimal contract even
among discriminatory wage contracts.
Proof of Lemma 6
Consider two classes 0 = (01; :::; 0n) and 00 = (001 ; :::; 00n). Order all elements of these
two vectors in descending order, denoted by 1; 2; :::; 2n, i.e., 1 is greater than or equal
to all elements of both classes, 2 is the second greatest element of all elements of both
classes, and so on. 1 is either in class 
0 or in class 00. Consider the permutation of
these two classes such that 1 is the rst element of one these two classes. Similarly 2 is
either class 0 or in class 00. Consider the permutation of these two classes such that 1 is
the rst element of one of these two classes and 2 is the second element of one of these
two classes. We can do the same for 1; 2; :::; n. Therefore, we have a permutation of
two classes, where 1 is the rst element of one class. Moreover, the rst element of the
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other class is one of the following: n+1; n+2; :::; 2n. Note that 1  n+1; n+2; :::; 2n.
Similarly, 2 is the second element of one of the two classes, and the second element of the
other class is one of n+1; n+2; :::; 2n. The same is true for any element i between 1 and
n. i is the ith element of one these classes, and the ith element of the other class is one
of n+1; n+2; :::; 2n. Furthermore, i  n+1; n+2; :::; 2n. Hence, using coordinate-wise
maximum and minimum on these permutations results in having 1; 2; :::; n in one class
and n+1; n+2; :::; 2n in the other class. Therefore, by using these permutations for these
two classes, one-step sorting is equivalent to sorting.
Proof of Theorem 5
Consider a function f(e; ); maximizing with respect to e we have:
fe(e
; ) = 0:
By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have:
e = g()) @e

@i
=  
@fe
@i
@fe
@e
=  fei
fee
: (A.7)
Therefore,
@2e
@i@j
=  f
2
eefeij + feeefeifej   feeifejfee   feejfeifee
f3ee
: (A.8)
Condition 8
f2eefeij + feeefeifej   feeifejfee   feejfeifee > 0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j; i 2 R+; j 2 R+:
Condition 9
f2eefeij + feeefeifej   feeifejfee   feejfeifee < 0; 8e 2 [0; 1]; i; j; i 2 R+; j 2 R+:
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If Condition 8 is satised, then (A.8) is strictly positive. Moreover, if Condition 1 is satised,
then Condition 8 is satised. Hence, the argmax is strictly supermodular if Condition 1 is
satised. If Condition 9 is satised, then (A.8) is strictly negative. Moreover, if condition
2 is satised, then Condition 9 is satised. Hence, the argmax is strictly submodular if
Condition 2 is satised.
Note that
f2eefeij + feeefeifej   feeifejfee   feejfeifee;
is either zero, strictly positive, or strictly negative locally. Therefore, locally the argmax is
either strictly supermodular, strictly submodular, or modular.
Proof of Example 1
Dene  = ( 1n)
P
i2(t) i. We have:
Pi =
e
n :
Pe = :
fi =
e
nu
0(:):
fi;j = (
e
n)
2u00(:):
fi;j ;e = 2(
e
n)u
00(:) + ( en)
2u000(:):
fe = u
0(:)  ce:
fe;e = ()
2u00(:)  ce;e:
fe;e;e = ()
3u000(:)  ce;e;e:
fi;e;e =
2
n(
)u00(:) + en()
2u000(:):
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Note that fi;j ;e and fi;e;e are strictly negative, and fe;e;e is negative. Therefore, Condition
2 is satised.
P i = Peei + pi;
P i;j = pe;eeiej + pe;jei + peei;j + pe;iej + Pi;j
= 1n(ei + ej) +
ei;j :
Want to show P i;j < 0:
1
n(ei + ej) +
ei;j < 0, 2ei <  nei;j
,  2 fe;ife;e <  n  1f3e;e ()
, 2fe;i <  n 1f2e;e ()
, 2
n
<  ()
f2e;efe;i
;
where
  =  f2e;efe;i;j   fe;e;efe;ife;j + fe;e;ife;jfe;e + fe;e;jfe;ife;e
=  f2e;efe;i;j   fe;e;efe;ife;j + 2fe;e;ife;jfe;e:
Note that
 f2e;efe;i;j  0; fe;e;efe;ife;j  0:
Therefore,
   2fe;e;ife;jfe;e:
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Because f2e;efe;i  0, it is enough to show:
2
n
<
2fe;e;ife;jfe;e
f2e;efe;i
, 1
n
<
fe;e;i
fe;e
:
Note that fe;e = ()
2u00(:)   ce;e and ce;e > 0; hence, fe;e  ()2u00(:). Therefore, fe;e;ife;e 
fe;e;i
()2u00(:) . It is enough to show:
1
n
<
fe;e;i
()2u00(:)
, 1n <
fe;e;i
()u00(:)
=
2
n
()u00(:)+ e
n
()2u000(:)
()u00(:)
= 2n +
e
n
()2u000(:)
()u00(:)
= 2n +
e
n
()2
()
u000(:)
u00(:) :
Because u
000(:)
u00(:)  0, we have:
2
n
+
e
n(
)2
()
u000(:)
u00(:)
>
2
n
:
which is what we wanted to show.
Proof of Theorem 6
Consider a general performance function p(e; ):
@(p

e=e )
@i
= @p@e
@(e

e=e )
@i
+ @p@i

e=e
) @(p

e=e )
@i@j
=
 
( @
2p
@e@e
@e

e=e
@j
+ @
2p
@e@j
)
@(e

e=e )
@i
+ @p@e
@2(e

e=e )
@i@j
+ @p@e@i
@(e

e=e )
@j
+ @
2p
@i@j

e=e
: (A.9)
Using (A.9) when performance is modular, i.e., pei(e; ) = 0; pij (e; ) = 0 8e 2 [0; 1];
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8i; j; i 2 R+; j 2 R+, we have:
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
=
 
( @
2p
@e@e
@e

e=e
@j
)
@(e

e=e )
@i
+ @p@e
@2(e

e=e )
@i@j

e=e
: (A.10)
1. By Theorem 5, under Condition 1, we have
@(e

e=e )
@i@j
> 0. Performance is convex,
hence, we have @
2p
@e@e  0. Moreover,
@e

e=e
@i
> 0 by Lemma 7. Therefore,
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
> 0.
2. By Theorem 5, under Condition 2, we have
@(e

e=e )
@i@j
< 0. Performance is concave,
hence, we have @
2p
@e@e  0. Moreover,
@e

e=e
@i
> 0 by Lemma 7. Therefore,
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
< 0.
Proof of Theorem 7
Consider a general performance function p(e; ), and recall (A.9):
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
=
 
( @
2p
@e@e
@e

e=e
@j
+ @
2p
@e@j
)
@(e

e=e )
@i
+ @p@e
@(e

e=e )
@i@j
+ @p@e@i
@(e

e=e )
@j
+ @
2p
@i@j

e=e
:
1.
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
> 0 because:
i) By convexity of performance, we have @
2p
@e@e  0.
ii) By Lemma 7, we have
@e

e=e
@i
> 08i 2 I.
iii) Performance is supermodular; therefore, we have @
2p
@e@i
 08i 2 I.
iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eort @p@e > 0.
v) By Theorem 5, under Condition 1, the optimal eort is strictly supermodular
@(e

e=e )
@i@j
> 0.
vi) Performance is supermodular; therefore, we have @
2p
@i@j
 0.
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Therefore,
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
> 0, i.e., sorting increases the total performance of students.
2.
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
< 0 because:
i) By concavity of performance, we have @
2p
@e@e  0.
ii) By Lemma 7, we have
@e

e=e
@i
> 08i 2 I.
iii) Performance is submodular; therefore, we have @
2p
@e@i
 08i 2 I.
iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eort @p@e > 0.
v) By Theorem 5, under Condition 2, the optimal eort is strictly submodular
@(e

e=e )
@i@j
< 0.
vi) Performance is submodular; therefore, we have @
2p
@i@j
 0.
Therefore,
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
< 0, i.e., sorting decreases the total performance of students.
General Method
Using (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9), we have:
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
=
  
@2p
@e@e
 
 
@2f
@e@j
@2f
@e@e
!
+ @
2p
@e@j
! 
 
@2f
@e@i
@2f
@e@e
!
+ @p@e

 
( @
2f
@e@e
)2( @
3f
@e@i@j
)+( @
3f
@e@e@e
)( @
2f
@e@i
)( @
2f
@e@ej
) ( @3f
@e@e@i
)( @
2f
@e@j
)( @
2f
@e@e
) ( @3f
@e@e@j
)( @
2f
@e@i
)( @
2f
@e@e
)
( @
2f
@e@e
)3

+ @p@e@i
 
 
@2f
@e@j
@2f
@e@e
!
+ @
2p
@i@j
!
e=e
:
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Note that
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
depends only on the primitives in this equation. Dene:
	(e; ) =
 
@2p
@e@e
 
 
@2f
@e@j
@2f
@e@e
!
+ @
2p
@e@j
! 
 
@2f
@e@i
@2f
@e@e
!
+ @p@e

 
( @
2f
@e@e
)2( @
3f
@e@i@j
)+( @
3f
@e@e@e
)( @
2f
@e@i
)( @
2f
@e@ej
) ( @3f
@e@e@i
)( @
2f
@e@j
)( @
2f
@e@e
) ( @3f
@e@e@j
)( @
2f
@e@i
)( @
2f
@e@e
)
( @
2f
@e@e
)3

+ @p@e@i
 
 
@2f
@e@j
@2f
@e@e
!
+ @
2p
@i@j
: (A.11)
If 	(e; )  ()0, then @(p

e=e )
@i@j
 ()0, i.e., sorting increases (decreases) the total perfor-
mance of students.
Proof of Theorem 8
First, we extend Theorem 5:
Lemma 13
1. If Condition 3 holds, sorting strictly increases the total eort of teachers.
2. If Condition 4 holds, sorting strictly decreases the total eort of teachers.
Proof: Consider a function f(e; q; ), maximizing with respect to e:
fe(e; q; ) = 0) e = g(q; )
) @e@i =  
@fe
@i
@fe
@e
=  feifee :
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Therefore,
@2e
@i@q
=  f
2
eefeiq + feeefeifeq   feeifeqfee   feeqfeifee
f3ee
: (A.12)
If Condition 3 is satised, then (A.12) is strictly positive. Moreover, Condition 3 implies
Condition 1. Therefore, if Condition 3 is satised, then (A.8) is strictly positive, by the
same argument as in proof of Theorem 5. Hence, the argmax is strictly supermodular if
Condition 3 is satised and sorting strictly increases the total eort of teachers. If Condition
4 is satised, then (A.12) is strictly negative. Moreover, Condition 4 implies Condition 2.
Therefore, if Condition 4 is satised, then (A.8) is strictly negative, by the same argument as
in proof of Theorem 5. Hence, the argmax is strictly submodular if Condition 2 is satised
and sorting strictly decreases the total eort of teachers.
Consider a general performance function p(e; q; ), and recall (A.9):
@(p

e=e )
@i@q
=
 
( @
2p
@e@e
@e

e=e
@q +
@2p
@e@q )
@(e

e=e )
@i
+ @p@e
@(e

e=e )
@i@q
+ @p@e@i
@(e

e=e )
@q +
@2p
@i@q

e=e
:
1. To prove the rst part of the theorem, we need to show that p(e; q; ) is pairwise
supermodular in students' types and pairwise supermodular in each student's type
and the teacher's type at the optimal eort. In Theorem 7, we established that under
these conditions, p(e; q; ) is pairwise supermodular in students' types.
We need to show that
@(p

e=e )
@i@q
> 0:
i) By convexity of performance, we have @
2p
@e@e  0.
ii) By Lemma 7, we have
@e

e=e
@i
> 08i 2 I.
iii) Because performance is supermodular, we have @
2p
@e@i
 08i 2 I and @2p@e@q  08t.
iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eort @p@e > 0.
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v) By Lemma 13, under Condition 3, the optimal eort is strictly supermodular
@(e

e=e )
@i@q
> 0.
vi) Because performance is supermodular, we have @
2p
@i@q
 0.
Therefore,
@(p

e=e )
@i@q
> 0. We can conclude that sorting increases the total performance
of students.
2. Similarly, to prove the second part of the theorem, we need to show that p(e; q; )
is pairwise submodular in students' types and pairwise submodular in each student's
type and the teacher's type at the optimal eort. In Theorem 7, we established that
under these conditions, p(e; q; ) is pairwise submodular in students' types. We need
to show that
@(p

e=e )
@i@q
< 0:
i) By concavity of performance, we have @
2p
@e@e  0.
ii) By Lemma 7, we have
@e

e=e
@i
> 08i 2 I.
iii) Because performance is submodular, we have @
2p
@e@i
 08i 2 I.
iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eort @p@e > 0.
v) By Lemma 13, under Condition 4, the optimal eort is strictly submodular
@(e

e=e )
@i@j
< 0.
vi) Because performance is submodular, we have @
2p
@i@j
 0.
Therefore,
@(p

e=e )
@i@j
< 0. We can conclude that sorting decreases the total performance
of students.
Proof of Theorem 9
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Consider a general performance function p(e; q; ), and recall (A.9):
@(p

e=e )
@i@q
=
 
( @
2p
@e@e
@e

e=e
@q +
@2p
@e@q
@(e

e=e )
@i
+ @p@e
@(e

e=e )
@i@q
+ @p@e@i
@(e

e=e )
@q +
@2p
@i@q

e=e
:
By proof of Theorem 8, we know that
@(p

e=e )
@i@q
< 0.
Consider two classes after student sorting with NAM. By sorting these two classes, we
get two new classes with student sorting with PAM. By Theorem 8, sorting decreases the
total performance of students, i.e., the total performance of students under NAM is higher
than under PAM. Furthermore, by Theorem 8, sorting increases inequality in students'
performance, i.e., inequality in students' performance under NAM is higher than under
PAM. To put it dierently, when two classes are sorted, i.e., student sorting with PAM,
changing the matching of teachers and class from PAM to NAM has the opposite eect of
sorting. Because when two classes are sorted with NAM, sorting results in two classes that
are sorted with PAM.
Proof of Lemma 10
We need to show that there is no blocking pair. Suppose i0; j0 and fw0(i0; j0; e)ge2[0;1] is a
blocking pair. First observe that if this wage schedule doesn't induce the ecient eort
then the same worker and rm can block with a dierent wage schedule that induces the
ecient eort. Under this wage schedule the worker will choose an eort e0 and will receive
w0.
Note that under the ecient eort rm j is indierent between matching with worker i = j
and worker i = j + 1:
(i; i; e(i; i)) = (i+ 1; i; e(i+ 1; i)):
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Moreover, worker i+ 1 is indierent between matching with rm j = i+ 1 and rm j = i:
u(i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) = u(i+ 1; i; e(i+ 1; i)):
Furthermore, because total surplus is strictly supermodular, we have:
s(i; i) + s(i+ 1; i+ 1) > s(i; i+ 1) + s(i+ 1; i),
(i; i; e(i; i)) + u(i; i; e(i; i)) + (i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1))
+u(i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) > s(i; i+ 1) + s(i+ 1; i),
(i+ 1; i; e(i+ 1; i) + u(i; i; e(i; i)) + (i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) +
u(i+ 1; i; e(i+ 1; i)) > s(i; i+ 1) + s(i+ 1; i),
u(i; i; e(i; i)) + (i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) > s(i; i+ 1)
Similarly we can show:
u(i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) + (i+ 2; i+ 2; e(i+ 2; i+ 2)) > s(i+ 1; i+ 2)
Adding these two inequalities and using the fact that u(i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) + (i+
1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) = s(i+ 1; i+ 1) we have:
s(i+ 1; i+ 1) + u(i; i; e(i; i)) + (i+ 2; i+ 2; e(i+ 2; i+ 2))
> s(i+ 1; i+ 2) + s(i; i+ 1),
u(i; i; e(i; i)) + (i+ 2; i+ 2; e(i+ 2; i+ 2))
> s(i+ 1; i+ 2) + s(i; i+ 1)  s(i+ 1; i+ 1):
Moreover, by supermodularity of s (lemma 9) we have:
s(i; i+ 2) < s(i+ 1; i+ 2) + s(i; i+ 1)  s(i+ 1; i+ 1):
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Hence:
u(i; i; e(i; i)) + (i+ 2; i+ 2; e(i+ 2; i+ 2)) > s(i; i+ 2):
We can do the same process for any i0 > i. Hence no worker i and rm j were i > j can
block this CE.
Now consider i < j. First observe that:
u(i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) + (i; i; e(i; i)) =
u(i+ 1; i; e(i+ 1; i)) + (i+ 1; i; e(i+ 1; i) = s(i+ 1; i)
Hence i+ 1; j = i can't block. Moreover, by supermodularity of total surplus:
s(i+ 2; i+ 1) + s(i+ 1; i) > s(i+ 2; i) + s(i+ 1; i+ 1),
u(i+ 2; i+ 2; e(i+ 2; i+ 2)) + (i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) +
u(i+ 1; i+ 1; e(i+ 1; i+ 1)) + (i; i; e(i; i)) > s(i+ 2; i) + s(i+ 1; i+ 1),
u(i+ 2; i+ 2; e(i+ 2; i+ 2)) + s(i+ 1; i+ 1) + (i; i; e(i; i))
> s(i+ 2; i) + s(i+ 1; i+ 1),
u(i+ 2; i+ 2; e(i+ 2; i+ 2)) + (i; i; e(i; i)) > s(i+ 2; i)
Hence i+ 2; j = i can't block.
Note that each worker gets at least zero utility and each rm makes positive prot, rms
are best replying, and workers are choosing the utility maximizing eort level.
Proof of Lemma 11
Suppose not, then there exists at least one pair of worker-rm such that the worker is not
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choosing the ecient eort. Therefore, there is another contract that induces the ecient
eort and increases the surplus of the match. Hence, there is a wage schedule that induces
the ecient eort, gives the worker a strictly higher utility, and strictly increases the rm's
prot. Therefore, a blocking pair exists, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 10
Suppose not, then there exists at least two pairs of worker-rm in a contracting equilibrium
such that i < i0, j > j0, ^(i) = j, and ^(i0) = j0. By Lemma 9, the total surplus is strictly
supermodular in the types of rms and workers, given the ecient eort for every rm-
worker pair. Since the total surplus is strictly supermodular, if we match i with j0 and i0
with j and let them choose the ecient eort, the total surplus increases:
s(i; j; e(i; j)) + s(i0; j0; e(i0; j0)) < s(i; j0; e(i; j0)) + s(i0; j; e(i0; j))
Hence, either (i; j0) or (i0; j) is a blocking pair.
Proof of Lemma 12
The following algorithm with n steps proves the result. Do the following step for i = 1; :::; n:
In step i: Select the following two pairs of matched worker-rm pairs: The pair that has
rm i as the rm and the pair that has worker i as the worker. If these are dierent pairs,
use meet and joint on these two pair, otherwise go to the next step.
In each step i, worker i will match with rm j = i as the result of joint operation. Hence,
after n steps, the matching is positive assortative matching.
Proof of Theorem 11
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1. Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) proves that, under Condition 5, the argmax (the ecient ef-
fort) is strictly supermodular eij > 0. By taking cross partial derivatives of production
function at the ecient eort, we have:
vij = vij + viee

j + vjee

i + veee

i e

j + vee

ij
) vij = sij + ceeei ej + veeij :
Recall that, sij < 0 >. By Assumption 1, cee > 0; ve > 0. Given Assumption 4 or 5
ei e

j > 0. Therefore, the total output at the ecient eort is supermodular. Hence,
PAM has the highest total surplus, the highest total output, the highest total labor,
and the lowest total leisure.
2. Because the argmax (the ecient eort) is strictly supermodular, by eliminating all
frictions in the labor market, the total eort increases. Given Assumption 4, the e-
cient eort is increasing in rm's technology. Recall that, starting from any matching,
there is a nite sequence of meet and joint operation such that the nal matching is
PAM. Therefore, it is enough to prove the result for implementing meet and joint oper-
ations once. Consider two pairs of worker-rm pairs, (i; j); (i0; j0), where i < i0; j > j0.
Implementing meet and joint operation is equivalent to assigning better worker i0 to
the better rm j. The better workers, matched with the better rm, works more than
the other worker matched with the better rm. Moreover, this increase in labor is
more that the decrease in labor in the lower rm after implementing meet and joint
operations. Stated dierently, the labor at the higher rm was higher at the initial
matching, compared with the labor at the lower rm. Moreover, the increase in labor
at the higher rm is greater than the decrease in the lower rm. Because the cost
function is convex, the total cost of eort increases as the result of implementing meet
and joint operations.
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Proof of Theorem 12
1. Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) proves that, under Condition 6, the argmax (the ecient ef-
fort) is strictly submodular. By taking cross partial derivatives of production function
at the ecient eort, we have:
vij = vij + viee

j + vjee

i + veee

i e

j + vee

ij
) vij = sij + sie( sejsee ) + sje( seisee ) + vee( seisee )(
 sej
see
)
 ve( s
2
eeseij+seeeseisej seeisejsee seejseisee
s3ee
)
) vij = ( 1s3ee )
 
sij( s3ee) + 2sie(sej)(s2ee) + vee(sei)(sej)( see)
+ves
2
eeseij + veseeeseisej   veseeisejsee   veseejseisee

) vij = ( 1s3ee )
 
(seisej)(veseee + 2s
2
ee   veesee) +
(s2ee)(veseij   sijsee)  (vesee)(seeisej + seejsei)

Under Condition 6, the total output at the ecient eort is supermodular. Hence,
PAM has the highest total surplus, highest total output, lowest total labor, and highest
total leisure.
2. Because the argmax (the ecient eort) is submodular, the total eort decreases.
Under Assumption 5, the ecient eort is decreasing in rm's technology.
Recall that, starting from any matching, there is a nite sequence of meet and joint
operation such that the nal matching is PAM. Therefore, it is enough to prove the
result for implementing meet and joint operations once. Consider two pairs of worker-
rm pairs, (i; j); (i0; j0), where i < i0; j > j0. Implementing meet and joint operation
is equivalent to assigning better worker i0 to the better rm j. The better workers,
matched with the better rm, works less than the other worker matched with the
better rm. Moreover, this decrease in labor is more that the increase in labor in
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the lower rm after implementing meet and joint operations. Stated dierently, the
labor at the higher rm was lower at the initial matching, compared with the labor
at the lower rm. Moreover, the decrease in labor at the higher rm is greater than
the increase in the lower rm. Because the cost function is convex, the total cost of
eort decreases as the result of implementing meet and joint operations.
Proof of Theorem 13
1. Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) proves that, under Condition 6, the argmax (the ecient
eort) is strictly submodular. Recall that:
vij = (
 1
s3ee
)
 
(seisej)(veseee + 2s
2
ee   veesee) +
(s2ee)(veseij   sijsee)  (vesee)(seeisej + seejsei)

Under Condition 7, the total output at the ecient eort is submodular. Hence, PAM
has the highest total surplus, lowest total output, lowest total labor, and highest total
leisure.
2. Eliminating frictions in the labor market results in PAM. By rst part of the theorem,
PAM has the highest total surplus, lowest total output.
Proof of Theorem 14
In a contracting equilibrium, if i < i0 and j < j0 where (i; j) and (i0; j0) are feasible matches,
then (i; j0) and (i0; j) is not part of a stable matching; i.e., it is not an equilibrium outcome,
because either (i; j) or (i0; j0) is a blocking pair.
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We want to show that for any given labor market with friction, if the total surplus in
a contracting equilibrium is strictly supermodular in worker's type and rm's type, then
the prot of the rm is strictly supermodular in worker's type and rm's type. Dene
r^(i; j) = w^(i)   c(e(i; j)) as the rent of worker i when he/she is matched with rm j, in
a given contracting equilibrium < fw^(i; j; e(i; j))ge2[0;1]; ^ >. Consider i < i0 and j < j0,
where (i; j) and (i0; j0) are part of the induced matching in the contracting equilibrium. By
revealed preferences, rm j0 prefers its current match compared with the worker assigned
to rm j:
(i0; j0; r^(i0; j0))  (i; j0; r^(i; ^(i)));
(i; j; r^(i; j))  (i0; j; r^(i0; ^(i0)))
) (i0; j0; r^(i0; j0)) + (i; j; r^(i; j))  (i; j0; r^(i; j)) + (i0; j; r^(i0; j0))
Therefore, the prot at the ecient eort level is strictly supermodular. Similar argument
proves the second part of this theorem.
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